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Pääomasijoitusmarkkina on viime vuosikymmenien aikana kasvanut merkittävästi ja tämän hetkiset 
rahastojen varojenkeruun ja sijoittamattoman pääoman tasot osoittavat, ettei suosiollisten ostokohteiden 
löytäminen ole helppoa. Yksi mahdollinen tapa rahastoille tämän ongelman lievittämiseksi on katsoa yli 
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kulttuurilliseen etäisyyteen ja institutionaalisten ympäristöjen eroavaisuuksiin liittyviin ongelmiin, kun 
taas lisääntyneet mahdollisuudet ovat yhdistetty parantuneeseen performanssiin. Lisäksi, maarajat 
ylittävään pääomasijoittamiseen liittyvä tutkimus keskittyy pitkälti venture capital-toimialaan ja buyout-
toimiala on jäänyt pienelle huomiolle. 
Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee maarajat ylittävien sijoitusten ja eurooppalaisten buyout-rahastojen tuottojen 
välistä suhdetta analysoimalla rahaston maarajat ylittävien sijoitusten osuuden vaikutusta rahastojen 
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testataan regressioanalyysillä. Tutkimuksen datana toimii Preqin-tietokannasta haettu otos, joka koostuu 
eurooppalaisista buyout-rahastoista, jotka on kerätty vuosina 2000 – 2010, sekä näiden tekemien 
kauppojen tiedoista aina vuoden 2019 alkuun asti. 
Tulokset implikoivat, ettei perusteita yleisesti positiivisille maarajat ylittävien sijoituksien osuuden 
vaikutuksille rahaston tuottoihin ole. Sen sijaan, vaikutukset riippuvat muutamista tekijöistä. Ensiksi, 
korkea maarajat ylittävien sijoituksien osuus näyttäisi parantavan isojen rahastojen tuottoja kun taas 
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yli menestyäkseen ja ne ovat myös todennäköisesti taitavampia kansainvälisessä sijoitustoiminnassa. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The private equity industry has seen tremendous growth during the past years. In search 
for returns, limited partners – the investors of private equity funds – have increasingly 
shown trust towards the industry in the form of directed capital, which has led to private 
equity fundraising to reach its all-time highs. Figure 1 shows the global private equity 
volumes. While the market is growing, so is competition, and an increasing amount of 
the raised capital is left as dry powder. With also valuations being high as ever, it gets 
harder for private equity managers to find good investments, and although global private 
equity deal volumes have been rising, over the past couple of years deal counts have not. 
 
Figure 1: Global private equity deal volume and count (McKinsey & Company, 2018). 
Given the competition and the heating market, it would be valuable to understand where 
the performance of the private equity industry comes from. Just like with other asset 
classes, history is not a guarantee of future performance in private equity (Braun, 
Jenkinson, & Stoff, 2017), and limited partners need to carefully evaluate where to direct 
their capital. Much of the existing literature studying private equity fund returns focuses 
on analyzing the performance in comparison to that of the public market equivalents (for 
example Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Phalippou & 
Gottschalg, 2009) with conflicting results in many cases. 
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Remarkably, the explanatory factors of fund returns have not been comprehensively 
explored, especially from the investing behavior or strategy viewpoints. Clearly, the 
private nature of the industry makes it difficult for researchers to carry out such studies 
since the companies do not often disclose thorough information leading to insufficient 
data. Prior research has mainly focused on fund characteristics and market effects in 
hopes of understanding fund performance drivers, as the persistence (Braun et al., 2017; 
Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), investor skills (Diller & Kaserer, 2009; Korteweg & Sorensen, 
2017) and fund inflows (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014; 
Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009) in fund performance context have been studied. 
In search for better investments, general partners may be prompted to increasingly look 
across borders. While private equity activity has been high in the US for years, true 
growth in the countries outside the US did not occur until the mid-1990s (Aizenman & 
Kendall, 2008). This growth was driven by general globalization happening in business 
around the world as well as excess funds directed to US private equity funds during the 
technology bubble. This led to the private equity industry in the US to mature and US 
private equity managers started to export their skills. Today the number of active buyout 
private equity firms outside North America represents about a half of the total market 
(MacArthur, Rainey, & Dessard, 2018). On the other hand, according to Aizenman and 
Kendall (2008), the private equity deals outside the US include cross-border targets 
significantly more often than in the US. 
Despite the frequency of cross-border participation in private equity deals, especially 
outside the US, the effects of it on buyout fund performance have not been studied. The 
currently existing cross-border private equity literature focuses on the legal and 
institutional environments of the countries (Cao, Cumming, Qian, & Wang, 2014; 
Cumming & Walz, 2010), geographical, social, and economical factors on capital flows 
(for example, Aizenman & Kendall, 2008), and syndication (Meuleman & Wright, 2011) 
or is otherwise heavily focused on venture capital. Holloway, Lee and Shen (2016) do 
study the relationship between performance and number of global acquisitions but they 
use performance as an independent variable for explaining the frequency of investments 
to a specific country. 
The motivation for this study is driven by the scarcity of research focusing on explaining 
private equity fund returns and, more significantly, their relationship with cross-border 
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investments. In the increasingly competitive environment, general partners, and 
especially limited partners, are likely to focus on strategies that are proven to perform 
well. Particularly, buyout funds that have been dominating the fundraising and 
performance over the past few years (see for example MacArthur et al., 2018; McKinsey 
& Company, 2018), are a point of interest as their performance will largely dictate the 
future of the industry. Surprisingly, however, cross-border private equity research has 
heavily focused on venture capital while buyouts have gained little attention. This thesis 
therefore contributes to the literature of cross-border private equity, especially that of 
regarding buyouts, and provides guidance on the decision-making of whether cross-
border investing could be a well-proven strategy. 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
This thesis aims at analyzing the effects of cross-border private equity investments on 
fund performance. The objectives are to review related existing literature, seek supportive 
information from investment professionals, and carry out a quantitative analysis, that then 
contribute to the field of research with valuable new insights. Given the objectives, the 
research question of the thesis is formulated as: 
- How does the level of cross-border investments in European private equity buyout 
funds affect the performance of the funds? 
1.3 Research design, methodology and scope 
1.3.1 Research design and methods 
The research design of this thesis is twofold, consisting of a theoretical and an empirical 
part. Firstly, in the theoretical part, the current academic literature on cross-border private 
equity investments and private equity fund performance is systematically reviewed. This 
is to gain an understanding on what has been studied previously and what are the factors 
influencing cross-border private equity investments and fund performance. Hypotheses 
are then formulated based on the theory and findings in previous literature. In addition, 
interviews on Finnish private equity investment professionals are used in the hypotheses 
development. Secondly, the hypotheses are tested in the empirical analyses by using 
quantitative analysis methods on buyout fund and deal data. 
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1.3.2 Data sources 
The data for the empirical part is sourced from the databases of Preqin, which provides 
data, solutions and insights for alternative assets industry globally. For the purposes of 
this thesis, both deal-level and fund-level data is retrieved. These sets of data are then 
matched in order to analyze the cross-border investments and performance in specific 
funds. Data for private equity firms’ office information is sourced from company 
websites, news articles and Invest Europe directories. 
1.3.3 Scope 
The scope of this thesis regarding the type private equity is narrowed to only include the 
buyout branch. Figure 2 illustrates the different types and strategies of managed private 
markets. In terms of fundraising and assets under management, buyouts represent the 
most significant type of private markets making it a relevant and an interesting topic to 
focus on, and it provides the available data viewpoint. On the other hand, academic 
research is largely concentrated on the venture capital industry especially in the cross-
border context. In addition, while cross-border investments and fund returns have been 
studied in the venture capital context (see Heliövaara, 2016), similar studies in the buyout 
field remain absent. 
 
Figure 2: Types of private markets and private equity. Based on McKinsey & Company (2018). 
Moreover, as the US is geographically the biggest market in buyout funds, and private 
equity in general, most of the academic research regarding private equity has focused on 
US-based private equity firms. Certainly, the most data is also available from the US 
private equity market. However, to provide a distinct contribution, and to narrow down 
the scope to more closer-by regions, this thesis focuses on European private equity firms 
and their funds. 
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1.4 Structure 
The thesis is organized into five chapters as follows. The next chapter consists of the 
theoretical part of this study. It is divided into an introduction to private equity, in 
particular leveraged buyouts, followed by a review on cross-border private equity and its 
challenges and opportunities. In addition, the existing private equity fund performance 
literature is reviewed. The next part of the chapter synthesizes the literature review and 
the hypotheses are then formed based on the findings in the theoretical part. 
Chapter 3 starts the empirical part by introducing the data and the data sourcing process. 
Next, the dependent, independent and control variables are described. Finally, the 
methods used in the analysis are explained. Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis 
divided into descriptive and regression analysis parts. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by 
discussing the results, the reliability and validity of the study as well as limitations, and 
provides ideas for future research. 
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2 Literature review and theoretical background 
2.1 Private equity overview 
2.1.1 Introduction to private markets 
Private equity, as the name suggests, is an asset class and part of private markets where 
capital is not publicly listed but rather comes from private entities and investors. It is also 
categorized as an alternative investment due to the differences in complexity and 
regulations with more ordinary classes such as stocks and bonds. The investment targets, 
most often companies, can either be private or public and offer potential for growth, and 
therefore enable value creation for the owners. The investment to private equity often 
comes from institutional investors, such as pension funds, and other accredited investors, 
such as high net worth individuals, who are able to commit substantial amounts of capital 
for long-enough times for the investment to be effective. 
Private equity as a term refers to a broader asset class, which includes different sub-forms. 
The general definition presented in chapter 1.3.3 first divides private markets into private 
equity and other private markets, and private equity further into buyouts, venture capital 
and growth capital. Buyouts, often also called as leveraged buyouts, refer to private equity 
investments where a company is completely – or majority of it is – acquired in order to 
develop it and eventually sell it with a profit. The financing of leveraged buyouts involves 
a heavy amount of debt. Buyouts are discussed further in chapter 2.1.2. 
Venture capital is a form of private equity where investment targets are startups or early 
stage companies that need funds to support their growth or to enter a market. It differs 
significantly from buyouts in that venture capital investors often make minority 
investments and take a more passive role as well as in that there is more risk and 
uncertainty involved due to the immaturity of the target companies. Further, growth 
capital is an investment to an already mature company that needs capital often to fund a 
transformational or otherwise significant event and is unable to obtain the financing from 
elsewhere. Similar to venture capital, growth capital investments are often minority 
investments (Stowell, 2012). Another form that is often distinguished is distressed private 
equity, which focuses on investing into financially stressed companies. 
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Other private markets investments include real estate, which consists of pooled 
investments into properties, often commercial buildings, and private debt, consisting of 
lending in the form of senior, subordinated or mezzanine debt. Furthermore, there are 
funds dedicated to investing into infrastructure assets as well as natural resources. In 
2017, buyouts, venture capital and growth capital represented about a half of the total 
private markets’ assets under management globally, while buyouts clearly dominated in 
the developed economic areas, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Global private market assets under management (McKinsey & Company, 2018). 
2.1.2 Leveraged buyouts and private equity 
As introduced in chapter 2.1.1, leveraged buyouts are majority investments executed by 
private equity firms and that are financed with a relatively high amount of debt and small 
amount of equity. In literature, and in general business terminology, terms buyouts and 
leveraged buyouts often refer to the same thing. Moreover, private equity is often 
associated with a practice carrying out leveraged buyouts and distinguished from, for 
example, venture capital, and the terms private equity and leveraged buyouts are also used 
interchangeably (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis 
and from this point onward, private equity is a term referring to leveraged buyout practice. 
The investments in private equity are carried out through a private equity fund, which is 
structured as a limited partnership and usually has a fixed lifespan of approximately 10 
8 
years with possible extensions (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). The limited partnership is 
formed between the private equity firm, which is the general partner and manages the 
fund and the investments, and the investors, who are the limited partners and commit 
capital to the fund. Often also, the general partner invests at least 1 % into its funds 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). In 2017, pension funds were the most active investors 
providing 29 % of all capital raised in European private equity, while funds of funds 
totaled 20 %, family offices and private individuals 15 %, sovereign wealth funds 9 %, 
and insurance companies 8 % (Invest Europe, 2017). Figure 4 illustrates the private equity 
fund’s stakeholder relationships. 
 
Figure 4: Private equity fund stakeholders and their relationships 
According to Jensen (1989), private equity firms are characterized by a lean, efficient 
organization that has very little overhead and employ relatively few people. With other 
productive structures, such as effective incentives of the investment managers, Jensen 
argued that private equity would be a superior organizational form in relation to 
traditional public corporations. Although private equity firms have grown in headcount 
and in what kind of talent they look for, a typical investment professional still has a 
background in investment banking or management consulting. Figure 5 shows the 
development in the number of firms in the global private equity market.  
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Figure 5: The number of private equity firms globally (MacArthur et al., 2018). 
The private equity firm is responsible for selecting the target companies to be bought, 
usually with the help of advisors, such as an investment bank and strategy consultants, 
negotiating the purchase price and securing the debt financing. Typically, the firm has 
five years to invest the fund’s capital and subsequently up to eight years to return the 
capital to the investors (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). In addition, particularly in the case 
of buyouts, the private equity firm manages the target company’s operations and decision-
making by making changes to the company’s management if needed, and by the 
controlling position in the company’s board of directors (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
Finally, the private equity firm is responsible for selling the company, and therefore 
closing the investment (Stowell, 2012). 
On the other hand, the role of the fund’s investors is significantly more passive and is, to 
a large extent, limited to committing the capital to be invested. After the commitment, 
they cannot affect the use of the funds, assuming the fund agreement, including covenants 
on investment size restrictions, portfolio company characteristics and fund economics, is 
obeyed (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009).  Although the capital is locked to a period of up to 
10 to 12 years, cash is usually returned to the investors as investments are sold. Also, 
rather than providing the whole sums up front, the limited partners commit a certain 
amount in the beginning, from which the general partner then draws as investment 
opportunities emerge (Stowell, 2012). 
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The capital flows, or revenue, for the general partner in a private equity investment 
scheme consist of fixed fees, performance-based fees that vary based on the fund returns, 
and investment costs (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; Stowell, 2012). Firstly, the manager 
reward consists of an annual payment called the management fee, which is paid by the 
limited partners to the fund managers as a compensation for the investing and 
management operations. This fee is usually around 2 % of the total capital commitments 
made to the fund in question (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). 
Secondly, part of the returns of the fund is allocated to the private equity firm to 
incentivize the managers to seek for excessive, above public market profits. These returns 
are called carried interest and they are usually subject to the fund exceeding a certain 
hurdle rate, for example 8 %. This performance fee is taken from the fund returns 
exceeding the hurdle rate and is usually around 20 % of the total profit (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010). Furthermore, transaction and monitoring costs are usually charged and 
are split between the general partner and the limited partners, with the general partner 
often receiving a larger share of the proceeds. 
2.1.3 Private equity investment characteristics 
Fund lifecycle and fundraising 
The lifespan of a private equity fund involves multiple phases of different activities 
creating the fund’s lifecycle (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Winkelman, 2018). First, a 
couple of years is spent in raising the funds from the investors. This period usually lasts 
for one to two-or-so years. Second, after some funds have been secured the firm starts 
looking into investment opportunities while still raising the final funds. This sourcing and 
closure of investments lasts from two to five or more years. In parallel with looking into 
the opportunities, the private equity firm manages and improves the portfolio companies 
for a period of three to eight plus years. Finally, the private equity firm looks to exit the 
investments and return the capital to the investors. Due to the lifecycle profile of a fund, 
the cash flows of the fund typically follow a J-curve in shape as the pattern in the 
beginning has net cash outflow and net cash inflows in the later years (Gilligan & Wright, 
2014). 
If a private equity firm is successful, it continues business by raising a new fund usually 
every three to five years. In the recent years, there has been a decreasing trend in 
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fundraising cycles with the average time between predecessor and successor fund 
closures decreasing by 10 months from 2013 to a level of 42 months in 2018 (Feliz, 2018). 
On the other hand, the lifespans of the funds have been increasing with median being at 
13.2 years in 2014 (Palico, 2015). If the firm has been able to create value for the investors 
in the previous fund, the subsequent funds’ size is often larger leading to larger absolute 
fees or general partners are able to charge higher fees per dollar under management 
(Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). Nevertheless, by raising a new fund relatively often, the 
private equity firm can sustain a guaranteed income stream that is not related to 
performance (Braun & Schmidt, 2014). 
The ability to raise a new fund is largely correlated with the general partners’ track record 
in realizing returns for the investors. Better performing partnerships allow the general 
partner to raise new and larger funds and poor performance leads to decreasing 
commitments (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). Given the relatively short cycle time between 
fundraising, the general partner needs to balance between the pressure of providing early 
returns and longer-term value. This might lead to a moral hazard in the partnership, in 
which the general partners intentionally want to signal the performance prematurely in 
order to raise a new fund. Therefore, they exit their best investments before they have 
reached their full potential (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), and leave the weaker deals to be 
liquidated after the closing of the follow-on fund. Braun and Schmidt (2014) find that 
investments exited before the closure of a follow-on fund are larger than those exited 
after. 
Investing phase and value creation 
The investing period for the fund involves a careful process of sourcing deals and 
analyzing the opportunities. Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016) found that 
while sourcing the deals, private equity firms leverage various sources including 
management, executive network, investment banks, deal brokers, and other private equity 
firms. According to the authors, most of the deals are sourced via either a process 
generated by the private equity firms themselves (35.6 %) or by investment banks (33.3 
%). The deals generated by certain stakeholders tend to differ in how available they are 
for other bidders and private equity firms look to invest in those that are proprietary. 
Furthermore, Gombers et al. (2016) and  Schmidt, Steffen, and Szabó (2010) suggest that 
larger and older private equity firms have higher quality sourcing and more resources 
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than smaller and younger ones, and are therefore able to take initially more promising 
deals into their further screening process and are favored for large and high quality target 
portfolios. 
The investment behavior has been found to differ based on certain market conditions and 
the experience of the fund manager. Favorable investment opportunities in terms of 
valuations, eased competition and prevailing credit conditions all affect this behavior, 
while younger funds are often less sensitive to market conditions in the hopes of proving 
a track record (Ljungqvist, Richardson, & Wolfenzon, 2007). Private equity firms are 
often experienced in certain industries, and therefore focus most of their investments on 
a sector they have a successful track record from. It is important for the managers to stay 
consistent with the funds’ objectives so that limited partners can manage the risk and 
return profiles of their portfolios. Limited partners see that drifting away from the agreed 
investing style might lead to underperformance and that the fund manager is incompetent 
(Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2009). 
A very important part of a private equity investment is the value-adding or holding period 
since it greatly affects the fund’s performance and how much return is generated for the 
investors. In this phase, the fund manager aims at increasing the equity value of the 
company by providing informal advice and access to networks and reputational capital, 
and participates in strategic decision-making, which enables restructurings (Schmidt et 
al., 2010). Historically, the average holding period of an investment has been little over 
four years (Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015) but after the financial crisis, this has increased to 
almost six years due to changes in exit markets, longer-term value-creation mechanisms 
and increased private equity competition (Mäkiaho & Torstila, 2017). 
The most important types of value creation during the holding period are revenue growth, 
improved incentives, improved corporate governance, cost reductions and changes in the 
management team (Gompers et al., 2016). Smaller companies achieve value through 
revenue growth, as they have more room to grow, whereas bigger companies rely more 
on increased margin (Achleitner, Braun, Engel, Figge, & Tappeiner, 2010; Gompers et 
al., 2016). Achleitner et al. (2010) find that overall, operational value creation has a 
greater effect on total value creation than financial structuring and revenue growth has 
three times the effect of margin expansion in EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, 
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depreciation and amortization) improvement. Value creation is discussed more in chapter 
2.3.1. 
Private equity transactions 
A leveraged buyout transaction involves a private equity firm purchasing a company or a 
business unit, from either the public or the private market. In case of a public-to-private 
buyout, the private equity firm normally ends up paying a 15 – 50 % premium on the pre-
offer stock price of the target company (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008; 
Kaplan, 1989). The purchase price is the enterprise value of the company, defined as the 
market value of the company plus the book value of the company’s debt subtracted by 
the amount of cash. The enterprise value is often measured with a multiple ratio to 
EBITDA. These multiples have recently hit all-time highs with an average US-based 
leverage buyout purchase price to EBITDA multiple rising from 7.7 in 2009 to 11.2 in 
Q3/2017 (MacArthur et al., 2018). 
The purchase price is financed with a combination of debt and equity. The debt portion 
is usually somewhere between 60 to 90 %, and most typically, the equity share has been 
found to represent only 25 % in large, at least $1 billion, buyouts (Axelson, Jenkinson, 
Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2013). The debt usually consists of senior loan provided by a 
bank or an investment bank and more junior type of loans, i.e. high-yield bonds or 
mezzanine loan (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). The remaining 10 to 40 % of the financing 
is equity, which is drawn by the general partner from the capital commitments made by 
the investors into the fund. To align the target company’s management’s – which is either 
new or the same as pre-transaction – interests with those of the new owners’, the 
management team usually provides a minor share into the equity part as well (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009). 
In practice, private equity deals are structured through a chain of holding companies, as 
illustrated in Figure 6, with new set of companies set up for each investment. In a simple 
model, the private equity firm creates a new holding company, which will hold the shares 
of the target company. The private equity fund and the management of the operating 
company will own the equity in the holding company. The fund will provide capital and 
lenders will provide debt to the holding capital, which will then buy the shares in the 
target company. In a more complex model, multiple new companies will be created so 
that different lenders have an own company they borrow money to, in accordance with 
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the subordination hierarchy of the loans. Therefore, the shares of target company are held 
in the holding company on the highest level. In addition to the subordination hierarchy, 
having multiple companies may, in some cases, imply tax benefits (Blomberg, 2008; 
Deloitte, 2017). 
 
Figure 6: Example private equity deal structure. Based on Deloitte (2017). 
Divestment phase and exit routes 
From the private equity firm perspective, the divestment phase of an investment is the 
most important part in the lifecycle of the fund and the opportunities for possible exits 
need to be considered already when the investment is made. Private equity funds have a 
finite contractual lifetime and a successful exit is the only way for the fund manager to 
liquidate the drawn funds, realize profits and return capital to the investors of the fund 
(Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). A sophisticated fund manager also has the ability to 
differentiate between potentially worthy investments and unsuccessful ones, and quickly 
writes off those that turn out non-performing (Schmidt et al., 2010). 
The exit decision, namely what exit vehicle to use and when to exit, is often a complex 
process and depends on various factors that can also change over time (Schmidt et al., 
2010). In addition to the price of the sale, factors like market conditions, fund 
characteristics, and portfolio company characteristics need to be considered (Jenkinson 
& Sousa, 2015; Schmidt et al., 2010). Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) suggest that reputation 
and age of the investment have an effect on exit route since fund managers are pressured 
to realize returns early enough in order to facilitate fundraising. The exit decision is also 
dependent on the size of the private equity firm and especially the size of the investment 
(Gompers et al., 2016). Both Jenkinson and Sousa, and Gompers et al. (2016) find that 
market conditions play a critical role in the exit decision-making regarding timing and 
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route, while Gombers et al. find that achieving the operational plan of the target company 
as well management’s opinion are expected to be important determinants of exit timing. 
The exit routes can generally be divided into three categories as suggested by Jenkinson 
and Sousa (2015): initial public offerings (IPOs), trade sales, and secondary sales. Figure 
7 shows the development of the values and volume of global private equity exits by exit 
route. Historically, trade sales or sales to strategic buyers has been the most common exit 
route, followed by secondary sales and IPOs. Surprisingly, the most focus in existing 
literature has been put on IPOs as exit routes, while in fact they are relatively uncommon. 
Papers by, for example, Gompers et al. (2016), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Schmidt et 
al. (2010), and Strömberg (2008) all document that trade sales represent about 40 to 50 
%, secondary sales 20 to 30 %, and IPOs 15 to 20 % of the chosen exit routes. 
 
Figure 7: Private equity exit value and volume by type (MacArthur et al., 2018). 
An IPO is an exit strategy where the portfolio company is first listed on a public stock 
exchange and the private equity company thereafter sells its shares in the market. Schmidt 
et al. (2010) mention that IPOs are generally done by companies that have a strong equity 
story or growth potential, and that they should thus become more rare with mature 
companies, which is a group private equity firms target. Schmidt et al. (2010) also find 
evidence to a widely documented phenomenon that IPOs are associated with better 
returns than other types of exit vehicles. They argue that this is an artifact of private equity 
companies taking the best performing investments public. In addition, and supporting the 
argument of the connection between profitability and buyout-backed IPOs, private equity 
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firms want to exit the investments via an IPO early rather than late due to the popularity 
and marketing effects (Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015). 
Moreover, stock market conditions are found to influence the decision for private equity 
firms to take their portfolio companies public. If the industry is going through a boom 
and valuations are high, private equity funds can realize excessive returns compared to 
other exit strategies, and therefore prefer the route (Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015; Schmidt et 
al., 2010). Good liquidity in the stock market is also favorable because the fund needs to 
be able to sell substantial stakes.  
Trade sales, most commonly, refer to an exit strategy where the private equity firm sells 
a portfolio company in a private market so that the acquirer is an operating company, 
usually a competitor working in the same market or a company wanting to expand its 
offering. Such acquirer is often called a strategic buyer due to the aim of realizing 
synergies through the acquisition. They represent the most common exit route for private 
equity investments. Strategic buyers usually look to make long-term combined 
improvements, and are therefore less sensitive for macroeconomic and industrial 
conditions (Holloway et al., 2016; Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015). 
Since trade sales often involve synergies, the purchasing price should theoretically be 
higher than in other types of exits as the synergies are modeled into the valuation. 
However, as private equity firms face pressure to realize investments towards the end of 
a fund’s life, and as the preferred exit route for the best performing investments is through 
an IPO, firms might have to settle for lower prices in trade sales (Jenkinson & Sousa, 
2015; Masulis & Nahata, 2011). Furthermore, trade sales are more likely for smaller 
companies and in case of a very large deal, there might not be a large enough strategic 
buyer to sell to (Gompers et al., 2016; Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015). 
The third common exit strategy for private equity investments is sales to another financial 
sponsor, also known as secondary buyouts or sponsor-to-sponsor sales. In a secondary 
buyout, the buyer is another private equity firm and is called a financial buyer because 
unlike strategic buyers, they are interested in the financial returns available from the 
investment rather than the strategic fit of the company. Secondary sales account for 
around 20 to 30 % of all types of exits and the figure has increased over time (Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009). Investments exited via secondary sales are characterized by longer 
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holding periods than trade sales and IPOs and offer liquidity for private equity funds that 
have investments that are not yet ready for an IPO (Gompers et al., 2016). Secondary 
buyouts considered, a typical leverage buyout remains in private equity ownership nine 
years after the initial transaction (Strömberg, 2008). 
Since the buyer in secondary sales is a private equity firm, and therefore uses a lot of debt 
for financing the investment, market conditions, such credit conditions or the pricing on 
the public market, have a significant impact on secondary sales activity (Jenkinson & 
Sousa, 2015). For example, secondary buyout activity was extremely high before the 
financial crisis, which was driven by the loose debt market conditions and available funds 
(Shivdasani & Wang, 2011). In addition, the availability of debt affects the prices in 
buyout deals, as the use of higher leverage allows the buyer to pay higher. This, together 
with high levels of capital committed shifting demand, make secondary deals an attractive 
exit strategy (Axelson et al., 2013; Jenkinson & Sousa, 2015). Given the current record-
high levels of dry powder, we could be facing another secondary buyout boom. 
2.2 Cross-border private equity investments 
2.2.1 Internationalization of private equity 
Similar to the overall private equity market, international activity has been significantly 
increasing during the past decades. As the most sophisticated country in financial equity 
markets, the US has historically been – and still is – the most active area for private equity 
professionals and investments. However, during the last ten years the rest of the world 
has been catching up. The number of buyout firms in Europe, Asia and other countries 
has grown faster than in the US (see Figure 5 in chapter 2.1.2) and, for example, the value 
of buyout-backed public offerings in Europe has exceeded the value of those in the US in 
the past few years (MacArthur et al., 2018). This suggests that the rest of the world, and 
especially Europe, provide competitive financial markets although large heterogeneity 
probably exists. 
Aizenman and Kendall (2008) argue that the start of the international private equity 
activity was driven by the general globalization of business and, especially in venture 
capital, by the 1990s’ IT bubble that directed excessive funds to the US and led venture 
capital investors to search deal flow across borders. While the number of private equity 
practitioners grew in other developed economies outside the US saturating the market and 
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tightening the competition, reformations in regulation made developing countries more 
favorable investment destinations (Wright et al., 2005). In buyouts, asset management is 
heavily concentrated to the US and Europe, while most of the assets under management 
in Asia and rest of the world are in venture and growth capital (see Figure 3 in chapter 
2.1.1). This suggests that large-scale buyout activity and expertise has yet to beach to 
developing countries. On the other hand, the lack of investor supply in countries can bring 
in foreign investors, which can stimulate their domestic markets as investors help the 
portfolio companies to internationalize, especially to their home locations (Mäkelä & 
Maula, 2005). 
These factors have driven international private equity inflows and outflows to grow 
outside the US and cross-border private equity deal volumes have been on the rise. In 
Europe, since 1988, the share of foreign sources of fundraising to private equity funds 
more than doubled to 45 % in 2003, while the share of cross-border invested amounts 
almost fourfolded to 29 % (EVCA, 2008). Overall, the share of private equity deals with 
cross-border participation between early 1990s and late 2000s has grown  from 15 % to 
40 % (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). The significant difference between the US and 
elsewhere is that in Europe and Asia, half of new funds raised come from non-domestic 
sources while in the US the share is 10 % with similar numbers for the funding of deals 
(Aizenman & Kendall, 2008; Wright, Pruthi, & Lockett, 2005). 
2.2.2 Cross-border private equity investing nature and challenges 
As essentially a knowledge driven business, private equity has certain differences with 
other types of industries that make it distinct and that are particularly interesting in a 
cross-border context. The business environments in different countries are heterogeneous 
and the required knowledge and resources by a firm to run business outside their home 
country are different from that of their domestic market  (Dunning, 1993; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977). This is also true for the private equity environment, as the industry 
comprises multiple fields, such as financial, legal, strategic, and operational, which all 
have their own characteristics that may vary geographically, and therefore require 
specialist skills from private equity practitioners  (Wright et al., 2005). Therefore, the 
activities private equity firms engage in during the lifecycle of the fund discussed in 
chapter 2.1.3 create challenges for the firm in international settings (Meuleman & Wright, 
2011). 
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Firstly, challenges are posed in the sourcing and selection phase of potential investments. 
In general, information asymmetries are a problem when it comes to venture capital 
investments, as there is often not much information available of companies that are non-
established or might not have a working business model. Although later stage buyouts 
usually involve targets that are more mature, and therefore have more information 
available of, the cross-border setting exacerbates the phenomenon of problematic deal 
identification (Wright et al., 2005). Moreover, the local institutional environment of the 
target might not be sufficiently familiar or relevant for effective deal generation and 
screening. 
Secondly, possible challenges in cross-border investments are also involved with the 
managing and value-adding phase. The monitoring phase might require visits to the local 
operational premises (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989) and some of the value-adding activities, 
such as controlling the board or replacing management (Gompers et al., 2016; Kaplan & 
Strömberg, 2009) require flexibility and coverage from the private equity firm and its 
networks. In particular, when the private equity firm does not have prior experience from 
the local market, the importance of picking the right management, in case of management 
replacement, is emphasized. 
Consequently, the cost of managing and monitoring the portfolio companies increases 
with geographical distance (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Distance has been found to be 
negatively related to cross-border deal volume suggesting that strong location bias is 
involved with cross-border investing (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). Naturally, intensive 
monitoring and advisory generate travel costs when the portfolio company is in a distant 
location. The geographical distance is a decisive factor for investment decisions due to 
the direct as well as indirect costs, and therefore discourages private equity capital flows 
(Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). According to Aizenman and Kendall (2008), distance can 
be considered as proxy for the lack of local information, social and business networks, 
and the difference in institutional environment. Indeed, especially in Europe, the legal, 
tax and operating environments are set on the country-level, which means the knowledge 
of the private equity firm may not be sufficient, and therefore the advisory role of the 
general partner might become less valuable (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
The nature of the local private equity landscape and the competitive environment also 
affect the investing behavior and opportunities of a foreign private equity firm. If the local 
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private equity market is less developed and only few experienced local private equity 
firms exist, there might not be too many opportunities to tackle the challenges in the local 
market by collaborating with local firms (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014). Private equity 
firms often syndicate with firms of similar prominence (Du, 2009; Lerner, 1994; Officer, 
Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). 
On the other hand, if the local private equity market is well developed, the high number 
of local firms may offer better opportunities for foreign players to find collaboration 
partners. However, these local firms might not be willing to collaborate due to the better 
experience and investing capability they possess and the pool of possible local syndicates 
that might be less risky (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Syndicated leveraged buyouts are 
more likely to happen between domestic partners than between cross-border firms (Cao 
et al., 2014). Further, a growing private equity market also means a more competitive 
interdependence between its members (Baum & Singh, 1994) and make local firms less 
willing to collaborate with foreign firms. Meuleman and Wright (2011) find that the 
likelihood of a cross-border deal to be syndicated decreases when the number of local 
private equity firms grow too high. 
2.2.3 Cross-border private equity investing opportunities and challenge 
remedies 
Institutional environment 
One key aspect regarding cross-border private equity activity is the institutional 
environment of a participating country. In a leveraged buyout, the private equity fund has 
two primary agency relationships: one with the manager or the shareholders of the target 
company and another with the bank providing the loan financing in a deal. Both of these 
agencies have their own legal conditions and rights that might differ by country, and as 
sophisticated participants, the private equity firms can have the ability to overcome the 
limitations of a weaker environment. In venture capital context, prior research has found 
that legal conditions affect the success of the investors and that experienced investors are 
able to negotiate effective contracts also in countries with weaker legal regime (Kaplan, 
Martel, & Strömberg, 2007; Lerner & Schoar, 2005; Nahata, Hazarika, & Tandon, 2014). 
Institutional factors also influence how a firm’s local resources affect performance. 
Having local experience is most valuable in countries where contracting institutions are 
weak (Taussig & Delios, 2015). 
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A first important institutional environment factor is creditor rights. Countries with strong 
creditor rights have better developed credit markets (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 1998), which positively affects the availability and the cost of debt financing. 
Therefore, buyout volumes and values are larger in countries with strong creditor rights 
(Cao et al., 2014). Consequently, Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and Axelson et al. (2013) find 
that cost of credit is a key determinant in investment decision-making as well as pricing 
of deals, both in the US and internationally, which also affects the returns. In addition, 
Cao et al. (2014) find that in cross-border leveraged buyouts the investments come from 
countries with stronger creditor rights to countries with weaker creditor rights further 
supporting the notion that countries with weak credit markets struggle in deal facilitation 
and require foreign participation with better access to financing. 
The legal environment for borrowers also affects the deal valuations and premiums paid 
to shareholders. Axelson et al. (2013) find that when credit conditions are favorable, 
private equity investors use extensive leverage to finance deals leading to overly high 
pricing and decreased returns. On the contrary, Cao et al. (2014) find that the premiums 
paid are smaller in countries with strong creditor rights and argue that strong creditors 
have the ability to apply restrictive covenants on borrowers, therefore limiting their value-
adding opportunities. In addition to creditor rights, legal shareholder and investor 
protection has an increasing impact on valuations and returns (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Lerner & Schoar, 2005). Furthermore, Cao et al. 
(2014) find that strong shareholder protection is associated with less cross-border deals 
and higher premiums suggesting that, creditor rights considered, private equity firms are 
looking across borders in search of cheap deals. 
Another factor regarding the institutional environment affecting cross-border investments 
is the advisory spectrum in the local market. Especially investment bankers play a crucial 
role in the deal generation and screening phase since they can significantly influence the 
deal flow where the private equity firm can draw opportunities. According to Gompers et 
al. (2016), one third of deals sourced are investment banking generated. The difficulties 
aroused by information asymmetry and otherwise problematic deal selection can be 
alleviated by a developed local investment banking industry. 
In addition to providing access to deal flow, local investment banks can help with other 
peculiarities that are related to, for example, the valuation of targets or the negotiations 
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and bidding, as information used, processes and methods vary by country (Kosnik & 
Shapiro, 1997; Manigart et al., 2000). Meuleman and Wright (2011) find that cross-border 
investments are less likely to be syndicated in the presence of a well-developed 
investment banking market suggesting that foreign firms do not need to resort on other 
connections as much when favorable professional advisory is available. In general, 
accessing external local resources might be challenging as the liability of being foreign 
grows with the idiosyncrasies of the local market. In this case, firms can turn to global 
markets for external resources toward which foreignness can be an asset (Taussig, 2017). 
Cross-border club deals 
The information asymmetries between the private equity firms and the potential targets 
pose difficulties for successful private equity practice and these challenges might be 
amplified in a cross-border setting (Wright et al., 2005). When investing in a foreign 
market, firms improve their knowledge and resource base required to address these 
challenges by entering into alliances (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000). In a 
private equity context, such alliance often means syndication. In a syndicated deal, or a 
club deal, two or more private equity firms jointly sponsor a leveraged buyout (Officer et 
al., 2010). In a cross-border private equity club deal, local sponsors partner up with 
foreign sponsors to invest in the target (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Knowledge obtained 
in one country about the business and institutional environment might be insufficient or 
not applicable in another. Therefore, private equity firms can gain knowledge by 
syndicating with local firms (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005). 
As teaming up with local firms can unlock valuable information about the target’s market, 
the ability and need for foreign private equity firms to rely on local syndicates is also 
affected by, and depends on, the development of the institutional environment. The 
experience and prominence of the local private equity firms influence the extent to which 
foreign private equity investors can use them as partners and effectively work on deals 
(Officer et al., 2010). In a weakly developed private equity market, there is not too many 
firms to team up with (Jääskeläinen & Maula, 2014) and up to a certain point, the 
likelihood of cross-border syndication grows with the number of local private equity firms 
(Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
Syndicating with local private equity firms can help to tackle the idiosyncrasies of a weak 
institutional environment (Bruton et al., 2005). For example, the aforementioned effects 
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of creditor rights can be facilitated with syndication. This is because syndication can 
allow overcoming capital restrictions, enable a more diversified portfolio and also provide 
access to more favorable debt conditions (Cao et al., 2014). Consequently, Cao et al. 
(2014) find that syndicated deals are more probable in countries with weaker creditor 
rights, which is supportive to the assumption that obtaining favorable credit is difficult in 
such countries. Furthermore, the ability to overcome capital constraints and better access 
to debt also allow private equity firms to target bigger companies and larger deal values 
have been found to be more likely among club deals (Cao et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, there may also be motives for the local private equity firms to syndicate 
with foreign firms. In a less developed private equity market, local firms look to syndicate 
with foreign firm to gain experience and knowledge on foreign markets (Jääskeläinen & 
Maula, 2014). In a developed market, it may be difficult for foreign firms to find syndicate 
partners due to the more extensive knowledge of the local firms and the greater number 
of local firms with whom to syndicate. In this case, the motive to syndicate with a foreign 
firm can rise from diversification (Manigart et al., 2006) or from strong sector 
specialization and know-how of the syndicate firm (Cressy, Munari, & Malipiero, 2007; 
Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2009). In addition, a local firm can choose to syndicate with 
a foreign firm in order for it to support the internationalization strategy of the portfolio 
company (Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). 
Private equity firm experience 
A private equity firm’s prior international experience and experience in the host country 
of the potential target can also affect its investing behavior. For a business, 
internationalization can be seen as a process of learning and gaining and building on 
knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). This is because the firm learns about the specific 
market and is therefore able to reduce institutional and other challenges posed by the 
foreign market. By operating in a foreign market, firms acquire business, institutional and 
internationalization knowledge, derived from the prior investment activity in the market, 
which they can capitalize on in the evaluation, selection, and management processes of 
investments (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
In addition to country-specific knowledge creation, multinational experience, i.e. 
experience in different countries, is also important for a firm’s internationalization 
process (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The diverse set of environments with different 
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institutional characteristics and the large variety of stakeholders the firm has to interact 
with add on the knowledge development of the firm (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). The 
richer the knowledge set, the more likely is that the firm can benefit from the experience 
in following international investment situation (Meuleman & Wright, 2011).  
The accumulated country-specific and multinational knowledge might also allow the firm 
to be less dependent on local partners (Liu & Maula, 2016). This implies that syndication 
is more useful in the early stages of internationalization when the local market is 
unfamiliar for the firm (Guillén, 2003). In fact, once local knowledge has been acquired, 
firms might prefer to invest alone since syndication may expose the firm to various 
agency costs and the benefits of cross-border syndication might start to be outweighed by 
the costs (Meuleman, Wright, Manigart, & Lockett, 2009). Meuleman and Wright (2011) 
find that the probability for a cross-border deal to be syndicated decreases as the country-
specific or multinational experience of the firm grows. 
Local offices 
One strategy suggested by literature for overcoming challenges related to distance in 
cross-border investing is establishing local branches. Private equity firms have been 
found to perform better and increase deal flow after opening a branch (Holloway et al., 
2016). In a venture capital setting, Li, Vertinsky, & Li (2014) find better probability for 
exit success when the firm has a local presence. Having a local branch allows for the firm 
to be closer to the market and the portfolio company, making it possible to provide 
improved support and monitoring (Hammer, Mettner, Schweizer, & Trombley, 2018; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011). In addition, the costs related to these activities as well as 
identifying targets are reduced when work can be done closer to the portfolio firm than 
from arm’s length (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Tykvová & Schertler, 2014). 
Having a local office, and learning about the local business and institutional context, can 
add to the direct knowledge gained from doing repeated deals in a country (Liu & Maula, 
2016) by expanding firms absorptive capacity (Levinthal & March, 1993). This way firms 
can accrue knowledge about the local context much faster than, for example, through 
syndication which can also be costly (Meuleman et al., 2009). The local presence can 
help the firm be more recognized in the market by helping in building networks and trust 
(Hosmer, 2011; Oliver, 1997), which is important if the firm wants to generate proprietary 
deals (Gompers et al., 2016). Furthermore, the local branch helps in mitigating 
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information asymmetries (Pruthi, Wright, & Meyer, 2009). Recruiting local professionals 
to the branch reduces cultural and institutional differences and improves knowledge 
transfer and communication with the portfolio company (Prijcker, Manigart, Wright, & 
Maeseneire, 2009; Pruthi et al., 2009). 
Table 1 summarizes the previous literature related to cross-border and international 
private equity. 
Table 1: Cross-border and international private equity literature 
Authors Research area Findings 
Aizenman & 
Kendall (2008) 
Internationalization of 
private equity 
Geographical and cultural distance affect deal flow 
Bruton et al. (2005) International venture 
capital 
VCs subject to different institutional forces in different 
countries affecting their behavior 
Cao et al. (2014) Cross-border buyouts Cross-border buyouts flow from countries with strong 
creditor rights to those with weak rights 
Hammer et al. 
(2018) 
Cross-border buyouts Local offices mitigate the negative effects of cultural 
distance on buyout performance 
Holloway et al. 
(2016) 
Cross-border buyouts One standard deviation increase in IRR associated with 
doubling of deals in a country 
Kaplan et al. (2007) International venture 
capital 
US style contracts are most efficient for VC success 
Lerner & Schoar 
(2005) 
International private 
equity 
Deals in countries with high legal enforcement have 
higher valuations and returns 
Li et al. (2014) Cross-border venture 
capital 
International experience mediates the negative effects of 
institutional distance 
Meuleman & 
Wright (2011) 
Cross-border buyouts Institutional context and organizational learning related 
to the use of syndicates 
Mäkelä & Maula 
(2005) 
Cross-border venture 
capital 
Foreign venture capitalists valuable when located in the 
target's market of internationalization 
Nahata et al. (2014) Cross-border venture 
capital 
Legal rights, developed stock market and cultural 
distance positively affect VC performance 
Pruthi et al. (2009) International venture 
capital 
Recruiting of local executives more important than 
sending people from headquarter country 
Taussig et al. 
(2015) 
Cross-border private 
equity 
Effect of local experience on performance strongest in 
countries with weak contracting institutions 
Tykvová & 
Schertler (2014) 
Cross-border venture 
capital 
Obstacles of great geographical distance can be 
overcome by syndicating with local VCs 
Wright, Pruthi & 
Locket (2005) 
International private 
equity 
Cross-border activity of private equity firms under-
researched, especially institutional context 
Liu & Maula (2016) Cross-border venture 
capital 
Venture- and country-level uncertainty distinctly affect 
syndication 
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2.3 Private equity fund performance 
2.3.1 Value creation in private equity investments 
Financial, governance and operational engineering 
The performance of a private equity fund is partly achieved through the value-creating 
actions taken by the fund manager on transaction level. Private equity firms create value 
to their portfolio companies through three types of actions, as suggested by Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009); financial engineering, governance engineering, and operational 
engineering. These actions are not unique to private equity owned companies but their 
effective use make them different from public corporations. Improving the portfolio 
company allows for better operating performance, which increases the value of the 
company, and therefore directly affects the returns of the investment for the fund. 
In Kaplan and Strömberg’s classification, financial engineering mainly relates to 
incentivized and motivated management. First, the equity ownerships of the management 
are significantly larger for private equity backed companies than for public companies 
suggesting that private equity firms use ownership stakes as a key driver for motivating 
and dedicating management (Kaplan, 1989; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Moreover, the 
management of the company is often required to invest into the company as part of the 
deal putting their own money at risk if the company fails to perform, while short-term 
gains are impossible due to illiquid nature of a private company. 
Second, the substantial amounts of leverage involved in financing the transaction puts 
pressure on the management to stay lean in terms of spending, as they are required to use 
free cash flow to take care of debt-related payments. In comparison, some companies with 
weak corporate governance in mature industries might misspend their cash flows rather 
than return them to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). In addition, value can be created through 
tax shield benefits on interest payments. 
With governance engineering, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) refer to the actions taken by 
the private equity firm while they control the board of directors of the portfolio 
companies. The boards of private equity backed companies are smaller and more active 
in governance compared to those of public companies. On average, private equity firms 
keep three board seats, give one or two to management and one or two to outsiders 
(Gompers et al., 2016). In addition, private equity managers easily replace management 
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if they are unsatisfied with the performance. In fact, Acharya and Kehoe (2008) find that 
every third chief executive is replaced within the first 100 days after the investment and 
two thirds within a four year period. Regarding how active private equity firms are in 
choosing the management teams, Gompers et al. (2016) report that private equity firms 
usually do not recruit their own management before the investment in hopes of appearing 
friendly but overall replace senior team more often than not. 
Finally, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) suggest that private equity firms apply operational 
engineering to their portfolio companies by involving industry and operating expertise to 
add value to the investments. This means that private equity firms hire also industry 
professionals with operative experience in addition to the typical transaction specialists, 
while many also use consultants and other outside advisors. The operating partners – the 
private equity investment team members with mostly operating experience – are often 
already involved in identifying sources of value creation pre-investment, whereas the role 
of consultants, who often carry out the commercial due diligence, is more significant pre- 
than post-investment (Gompers et al., 2016). In addition to the actions taken in 
governance engineering, private equity firms expect to create value by crafting the 
portfolio company’s strategy or business model and by changing the CEO, CFO and other 
management, suggesting they engage in operational engineering (Gompers et al., 2016). 
Value creation evidence 
Most of the existing literature has associated buyouts with positive operating 
performance, suggesting that the value-increasing actions taken by the private equity firm 
described above actually convert into realized improvements. Starting from transactions 
in 1980s, Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) report significant operating performance 
improvements in public-to-private management buyouts. For example, Kaplan (1989) 
finds increases in operating income to sales and to assets ratios of 20 % relative to industry 
and increases in net cash flow of 50 % relative to industry. He and Smith (1990) argue 
that these effects are due to improved incentives rather than layoffs or insider information. 
More recently, Cohn and Towery (2013) find operating improvements in private equity 
buyouts of private firms, while Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) and Cohn, Mills, and 
Towery (2014) report only modest operating improvements in leveraged buyouts. 
In addition to the accounting performance improvements on portfolio-company level, 
literature has addressed the real effects related to buyouts, which have again turned out to 
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be largely positive. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) find that leveraged buyouts, especially 
management buyouts, in the US result in significant increases in total factor productivity 
of plants after the buyout. They add that employment and wages of overhead workers 
decline while those of blue-collars remain unchanged. Consistent with this, Harris, Siegel, 
and Wright (2005) find that the productivity of UK companies substantially increases and 
that plants involved in the buyouts are less productive than peer plants to start with. This 
implies that buyout initiators are targeting plants that have productivity improvement 
potential. 
Furthermore, Davis et al. (2014) also document productivity gains in a large set of 
establishments in US buyouts and find those to be related to divestments of less, and 
acquisition of highly, productive establishments. Overall, Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 
(2007), who thoroughly review the governance and returns related literature in private 
equity and leveraged buyouts, conclude that buyouts increase performance regardless of 
the measurement approach. 
2.3.2 Fund performance measurement 
The value created on the portfolio company or transaction level defines the performance 
of the whole private equity fund. The ability to measure this performance on the fund 
level is important from both the private equity firm, i.e. the general partner, and the fund 
investors, i.e. the limited partners, point of views. First, as discussed earlier the general 
partner’s earnings are partly based on the return they can provide for the investors in the 
form of carried interest (for example Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). Therefore, it is important 
that the general partner is aware of how their fund is performing currently and how it is 
projected to perform in the future. In addition, the persistence of returns and the track-
record of the general partner affect the fundraising of the partnerships spurring private 
equity firms to show good performance (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
Second, private equity as an asset class is characterized with some unique features, such 
as irregular timing of cash flow intervals from investors to the fund and back, 
complicating the tracking of performance. Therefore, limited partners need to be able to 
somehow measure and benchmark the performance of their investments against other 
asset classes. Furthermore, when investors compare partnerships there has to be a 
consistent way of measuring their performances. 
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Due to the difficulty of pricing the private investments of private equity funds lacking 
publicly disclosed information, the most typical performance measures rely on the cash 
flows between the fund and the limited partners. These measures include the internal rate 
of return (IRR) and the multiple of invested capital (MIC) also known as total value paid 
in capital. The IRR is the discount rate for which the present value of cash inflows for the 
investors equal the present value of cash outflows, while the MIC is the ratio of 
cumulative inflows to cumulative capital outflows. Both measures are reported net of 
fees. When the fund is still active, and all investments have not been liquidated, the 
calculations of the returns include the net asset value (NAV) of the residual investments. 
The formula for the interim IRR calculation, as suggested by Mathonet and Meyer (2005), 
is as follows: 
 
CF 
(1 + IRR )
 
+
NAV 
(1 + IRR )
 
= 0
 
   
,  
where CF  is the cash flow between the fund and the investors at the end of time period i, 
n is the number of time periods, NAV  is the latest net asset value of the fund, and IRR  
is the interim internal rate of return at time n. 
The benefit of the IRR and MIC methods is that they allow analyzing investments with 
irregular and different sizes of cash flows. According to the British Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association they are quick and straightforward methods that are easy to 
interpret. These methods, especially the IRR, are very commonly used, and are 
recommended by most venture capital and private equity associations. Therefore, the IRR 
is also used as the performance measure in this thesis. In addition, the IRR is versatile in 
that it can be separately calculated for each investment the fund makes and is also the 
most typical method for evaluating investment opportunities (Gompers et al., 2016). 
Despite the popularity of the IRR and MIC methods, they both have their weaknesses. 
Since both metrics provide absolute measures, they do not give any view on how a fund 
is performing relative to the overall market, and therefore do not control for risks (Kaplan 
& Sensoy, 2015). To overcome these limitations, a few methods, known as the public 
market equivalents (PMEs) have been suggested to market-adjust the IRRs and MICs. 
Firstly, Long and Nickels (1996) propose a method – later called LN PME – that provides 
a comparison of the IRR of the relevant public benchmark group and the IRR of the 
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private equity fund. The strength of the LN PME is that the IRR is a familiar metric for 
many investors, with the downside being that successful early exits skew the fund’s 
performance to be overly positive (Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015). 
Secondly, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) propose a similar method for MICs called the 
Kaplan and Schoar (KS) PME that is the ratio of the sum of discounted distributions to 
the sum of discounted capital calls, and where the discount rate is the total return of a 
relevant benchmark group, often the S&P 500 index. In other words, a KS PME greater 
than one outperforms the benchmark with all fees taken into account. The method is very 
intuitive although the disadvantage, compared to the IRR, is that it provides a cumulative 
measure rather than an annualized return (Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015). The KS PME is by 
far the more commonly used PME metric and is simply referred to as PME hereafter. 
One notable question regarding all the metrics is the reporting of interim fund returns, i.e. 
returns when all the investments are not yet liquidated. In this case, the performance is 
based on the fund’s NAV that is necessarily based on a subjective view of the fund 
manager. This issue is especially important since, as discussed earlier in chapter 2.1.2, 
fund performance has a substantial effect on the fundraising capability of the firm and 
funds have been found to strategically time their exits to boost the returns (Gompers, 
1996). Therefore, to facilitate better fundraising, firms, especially those that are 
underperforming, may be inclined to report inflated NAVs and returns during fundraising. 
On the other hand, limited partners may be able to see through the manipulation as these 
firms are able to raise a follow-on fund less often (Brown et al., 2019). Kaplan and Sensoy 
(2015), who survey related literature, conclude that performance results in existing 
research are reliable, as it is not clear whether limited partners believe the possibly over-
aggressive NAV reporting. 
2.3.3 Fund-level performance evidence and drivers 
Fund performance evidence 
The early evidence of fund-level performance largely culminates around three papers 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Ljungqvist & Richardson, 2003; Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009) 
written during the 2000s. The time-period of these studies is roughly the same focusing 
on fund vintages in 1980s and 90s and cash flow data extending to early 2000s. Ljungqvist 
and Richardson (2003) use cash flow data from one limited partner with a relatively small 
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sample (73 funds) and estimate that the sample outperforms the equity market. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) use a larger sample of data derived from Venture Economics and find 
that fund performance approximately equals that of the S&P 500 when measured with 
PME, with the exception that larger venture capital funds outperform. Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2009) use the same data from Venture Economics but write off the funds’ 
NAVs that are over ten years old. With this adjustment, they find that the average PME 
decreases and conclude that private equity underperforms the public benchmark. 
However, later evidence has shown that the results found in the earlier studies might 
suffer from flaws in data and methodology and that the results might be inaccurate. A 
notable contribution is Stucke (2011) who finds that the NAVs are not updated in the 
Venture Economics’ data due to voluntary disclosure, and that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) both misinterpret the NAVs. By collecting new cash 
flow and NAV data from actual limited partners, Stucke finds that the NAVs are actually 
greater than reported and documents significant private equity outperforms in terms of 
PME. Since then researchers have drifted away from the Venture Economics data and 
obtained new cash flow-based data to study the performance. The findings from these 
data imply that private equity buyout funds have outperformed the S&P 500 index by 
roughly 20 % during the lifespan of the fund (Higson & Stucke, 2012; Phalippou, 2014; 
Robinson & Sensoy, 2016). Overall, in light of the newer research, it can be concluded 
that private equity buyout funds have historically outperformed the public markets or at 
least the S&P 500 in the US. 
Fund performance drivers 
In their widely cited paper, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that returns of a fund are 
strongly positively associated with the performance of the subsequent fund the general 
partner raises. Consistent with this, Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan, and Stucken (2014) 
confirm these results in their extensive study for funds raised pre-2000. On the contrary, 
they find only little evidence of persistence for funds post-2000. Furthermore, Robinson 
& Sensoy (2016) report that performance persistence has remained since Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005), as their data extends fund vintages to 2009. Kaplan and Sensoy (2015) 
summarize, and Braun et al. (2017) support, that overall there is evidence of persistence 
but this has decreased over time. 
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The evidence of performance persistence, and the fact that there is great heteroscedasticity 
in overall fund performances (e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), suggests that there is variance 
in the skills of the general partners and that some general partners apply the value-
increasing engineering on transaction level discussed earlier more effectively than others. 
Supporting this assumption, and documenting that persistence is not merely an US 
phenomenon, Diller and Kaserer (2009) find persistence in their European data that is not 
explained by market timing and conclude that these fund managers are skilled. 
Building on Kaplan and Schoar (2005) who analyze persistence only in consecutive funds 
and closely previous funds, Korteweg & Sorensen (2017) use a different methodology 
and find significant long-term persistence with estimated returns between the top and 
bottom quartile firms being 7 to 8 percentage points annually. New to other research, they 
control for the effect of consecutive funds managed at the same time. A closely related 
aspect to general partner skill is their experience, i.e. how many funds the general partner 
has managed. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) document that more experienced funds perform 
better and are able to survive with less damage with funds raised in boom times that 
overall perform worse. In addition, Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) find that 
inexperienced funds have lower performance. Further, buyout managers use their 
experience to raise larger funds earning them higher revenues per partner (Metrick & 
Yasuda, 2010). The ability to do this suggests that they earn the trust of limited partners, 
which implies high performance and a connection between experience and performance. 
Since experienced managers raise larger funds, research has also studied the effect of fund 
size on fund performance. Overall, the evidence is consistently significant that fund size 
influences returns and that returns increase with fund size (for example Phalippou & 
Gottschalg, 2009). However, the relationship has also been found to be concave in shape 
resulting in a decrease in returns when the fund size grows really high (Kaplan & Schoar, 
2005; Ljungqvist & Richardson, 2003; Robinson & Sensoy, 2016).  
Nevertheless, research provides little theory on why fund size is a significant determinant 
for fund performance. In fact, skill and track record seem to be the stronger independent 
variables and fund size rather an artifact of those. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) 
conclude that fund size is a good proxy of skill and that past performance is a unique 
explanatory variable. On the other hand, the decreasing effect of fund size on fund 
performance when funds grow large could be due to these funds raised in boom times 
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when capital flow to private equity is high. When the market is hot, valuations are high 
leading to private equity funds’ inability to close the best deals (Gompers & Lerner, 
2000). Kaplan and Schoar (2005) suggest that funds raised during boom times perform 
worse. 
Deal syndication, where private equity funds jointly sponsor a buyout, have also been 
found to affect returns.1 The so-called club deals can be motivated by capital constraints 
prohibiting investments in high transaction value targets, which, while related to fund 
sizes, can influence fund performance. Even though capital constraints are not a barrier, 
diversification can induce syndication for large or risky buyouts. In addition to equity 
capital, syndication can influence the obtaining of leverage, which in a buyout has a 
significant role in return generation and value creation. If multiple firms enter a deal, the 
combined reputation can be greater than in sole-sponsored deals, and therefore be more 
attractive and credible for debt providers. (Cao et al., 2014; Officer et al., 2010) 
One reason for improved returns in a club deal is the possible presence of collusive 
bidding, in which joint sponsors limit the number of competing bidders, and therefore 
increase their bargaining power over existing shareholders. Even in the absence of 
collusion, syndication can lead to lower prices when not enough private equity firms are 
interested in a target and competition is reduced. Cao et al. (2014) and Officer et al. (2010) 
report that targets in club deals are valued at lower multiples and target shareholders 
receive lower premiums, respectively. On the other hand, Guo et al. (2011), who find that 
returns are higher for club deals, find no significant relation to competition, and suggest 
that multiple firms are attracted by superior prospects, therefore leading to successful 
investments.  
Previous literature has also suggested that fundraising, i.e. the capital inflows into private 
equity funds, has an effect on the success of private equity funds. Distinct from the other 
performance drivers discussed above, fund inflows can affect a broader range of funds, 
                                                 
1 Literature primarily does not study syndication as a fund-level variable affecting returns but rather on 
transaction level. This is natural as syndication is not a fund characteristic, and it has implications on the 
selection and monitoring phases of individual deals. In fact, at least in the venture capital context, 
syndication affects returns primarily through the value added during holding period (Brander et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, in general, syndication is more common in venture capital than in later stage buyouts. On the 
other hand, a typical venture capital fund makes significantly more investments than a buyout fund, and 
therefore one syndicated deal in a buyout fund represents a higher share of the total number of investments 
in the fund. Thus, as one investment also significantly affects returns, here syndication is included under 
fund-level drivers for fund performance. 
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and therefore affect the whole market rather than particular funds. One specific branch of 
research has studied the effect of fund inflows on investment valuations. Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) find that capital inflows into venture capital funds increase the valuations 
of their investments, while the effect is highest in areas with the most venture capital 
activity. They argue that the inflation in prices is due to a demand pressure caused by a 
competition for a limited number of superior investment targets. 
The relationship has been since also studied in the buyout context and on fund level. 
Ljunqvist and Richardson (2003) show that more money raised in a private equity funds’ 
vintage year, both venture capital and buyout, the worse the fund’s subsequent 
performance. They argue that the ‘money chasing deals’ phenomenon suggested by 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) is present also in the buyout industry. These results have 
been further confirmed by, for example, Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) and Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2009) who both document a negative relationship between capital 
commitments and fund returns. These results are consistent with Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) who conclude that fund performance is procyclical: funds raised during boom 
times perform worse. 
Table 2: Fund performance drivers 
Fund performance driver Supporting literature 
Fund size Kaplan & Schoar (2005), Ljungqvist & Richardson (2003), 
Phalippou & Gottschalg (2009), Robinson & Sensoy (2016) 
 
General partner skill/experience Diller & Kaserer (2009), Kaplan & Schoar (2005), Korteweg & 
Sorensen (2017), Metrick & Yasuda (2010), Phalippou & 
Gottschalg (2009) 
 
Fund inflows Gompers & Lerner (2000), Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, (2014), 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005), Kaplan & Strömberg (2009) Ljungqvist 
& Richardson (2003) 
 
Syndication Brander, Amit, & Antweiler (2002), Cao et al. (2014), Guo et al. 
(2011), Officer et al. (2010) 
2.4 Synthesis 
Private equity is an alternative investment asset class where the capital comes from 
private entities and investors rather than being publicly listed. Buyouts are a type of 
private equity investments where a majority of a company’s shares is bought by a private 
equity fund in order for the firm to control the board of directors and allow for making 
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value-adding decisions. Leverage buyouts are the most common financing type of 
buyouts and involve a significant amount of debt. The lifecycle of a private equity fund 
consists of fundraising, deal screening and sourcing, value adding, and exit periods. Often 
a fund has a contractual life of 10 to 13 years and the fundraising for a subsequent fund 
is started already a few years after the previous is raised. Private equity firms scale their 
business by raising larger funds, through which they earn higher fees. The success of an 
investment is determined by the actions taken in all phases of the fund’s lifecycle. Typical 
exit routes include initial public offerings, sales to strategic buyers or sales to another 
private equity fund. 
International private equity has grown rapidly during the past decades driven by the 
maturing private equity market in the US in early 1990s. This led to an increase in the 
number of firms outside the US as well as funds investing across borders. Despite gaining 
access to increased deal flow with cross-border investments, they do not come without 
risks. Cross-border private equity poses challenges related to informational asymmetries, 
cultural distance, and idiosyncrasies and nature of a foreign institutional environment in 
every phase of a fund’s lifecycle. On the other hand, private equity firms can tackle these 
challenges by learning and gaining knowledge about foreign markets. This knowledge 
can be obtained by engaging in club deals with local firms, gaining direct multinational 
or country-specific investing experience or establishing local offices in the host country. 
In addition, the differences in the institutional environment can provide opportunities not 
present in the domestic market. 
Private equity funds earn returns by selling portfolio companies they have developed 
during the holding period with a profit. This development is achieved through the value-
increasing actions taken by the private equity firm that can be divided into financial, 
governance and operational engineering. These actions include incentivizing 
management, making changes in the management and developing operations by bringing 
in operational expertise. Generally, buyout investments have had positive increases in 
operating performance. The performance of a private equity fund can be measured in 
many ways, but most commonly internal rate of returns and multiples of invested capital 
are used. Historically, private equity funds have been found to outperform public markets, 
therefore making them a profitable alternative for investors. The performance of the funds 
is driven by the fund size, capital inflows into the funds, general partner skill and 
experience, and investment syndication. 
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2.5 Hypotheses 
2.5.1 Cross-border investments and fund performance 
A key condition for successful private equity business is the availability of potential deals 
and the ability to identify these deals. When investment opportunities for private equity 
firms improve, the bargaining power of the general partner usually increases due to the 
short-term constraint in the supply of funds, and this leads to accelerated investing and 
better returns for the fund (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). Regardless of whether the investment 
opportunity environment is measured in market valuation levels or merely in the number 
of available targets, it is on the responsibility of the general partner to select the prominent 
deals and when competent at this, they usually experience superior returns (Diller & 
Kaserer, 2009). 
Since the investing climate in different geographies varies, the quality of investment 
opportunities in some countries can be significantly better than in others. In addition, 
some countries may be constrained by the number of available deals in absolute terms 
and relative to the number of existing private equity firms, and the returns have been 
found to be better when competition eases (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). Therefore, it is 
intuitive that by not limiting its investing initiatives to only domestic targets, a fund has 
access to more opportunities and increased chances for successful investments. Cross-
border deals have been found to be associated with lower premiums (Cao et al., 2014). 
The institutional and legal environments vary significantly across countries with 
implications on investing and value creation success. The strength of creditor rights of 
financial institutions affect the development of the country’s credit market and strong 
credit markets provide more favorable debt financing (La Porta et al., 1998). The cost of 
credit, in turn, is a major determinant of private equity investment decision-making and 
pricing (Axelson et al., 2013; Ljungqvist et al., 2007) influencing the availability of 
investments and premiums paid. Strong creditor rights also allow borrowers to limit the 
value creation activities that private equity firms apply on their portfolio companies (Cao 
et al., 2014). Investing activity flows from countries with strong creditor rights to 
countries with weak creditor rights (Cao et al., 2014). Furthermore, strong shareholder 
protection increases the bargaining position of existing shareholders often increasing 
premiums (Cao et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 2002; Lerner & Schoar, 2005). Cross-border 
deals can therefore provide cheaper and more flexible opportunities. 
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Cross-border investing involves costs related to the geographic and cultural distance 
between the target company and the private equity firm suggesting a location bias 
(Aizenman & Kendall, 2008; Cumming & Dai, 2010).  Especially, distance can be a 
inhibiting factor for capital flows (Tykvová & Schertler, 2014) making cross-border 
investing less likely. In addition, private equity investing has risks originating from 
information asymmetries, related to the target company and the institutional environment, 
which are likely to be exacerbated in cross-border settings (Wright et al., 2005). However, 
these risks are less likely in buyout investments since the private equity firm has more 
resources and the investments are later stage and made to more mature companies. This 
was also supported by the interviews, where the interviewees agreed that “Everybody 
knows how these deals are made”, referring to that the use of advisors and the matured 
industry make the institutional differences insignificant. 
Specifically, the challenges posed by the cultural distance can be anticipated and reacted 
on through rigorous deal selection and monitoring leading to increased investment 
success (Nahata et al., 2014; Wright, Lockett, & Pruthi, 2002). In fact, the performance 
for private equity investments might increase with cultural distance (Nahata et al., 2014) 
since, the challenges considered, it would not make sense for the firm to invest abroad 
unless due diligence and other screening were done carefully. Therefore, challenges are 
expected to be more closely related deal flow rather than performance and if a cross-
border deal is done, the firm is more certain about its success than normally. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the share of cross-border investments in a 
fund, the better the fund performance. 
2.5.2 Fund size, experience, cross-border investments and fund performance 
Private equity is a type of service business that can be characterized as highly knowledge 
intensive. The success of a fund is, to a large extent, determined by the private equity 
firm’s ability to find potential investments, structure them effectively, perform value 
increasing activities during the holding period of the investment, and facilitate a high 
value exit (Gompers et al., 2016). Therefore, general partner skill is a significant factor 
for the success of a fund as skilled general partners show their expertise by consistently 
realizing good returns for their funds. The performance of private equity funds persists 
with high returns on a previous fund likely leading to high returns in the following 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015; Robinson & Sensoy, 2016). 
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Private equity fund managers build on their experience and grow their business by 
increasing the size of the funds they raise (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010). By showing 
consistently good results, general partners earn a credible track record and build trusted 
relationships with investors who see them as skilled managers for their money. 
Experience is a key factor in fundraising and performance as younger funds invest in 
riskier buyouts in order to build a track record and to raise new, and eventually larger, 
funds (Ljungqvist et al., 2007). Hence, the size of the fund mirrors the experience and 
skill of the general partner and fund size can be considered a proxy of this skill (Phalippou 
& Gottschalg, 2009). Consequently, larger funds earn better returns (for example Kaplan 
& Schoar, 2005; Ljungqvist & Richardson, 2003; Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009).2  
The implications of fund size in a cross-border private equity context are twofold. First, 
larger funds have the ability to overcome the increased costs associated with investing in 
another country and do not run into capital constraints that easily. This means that larger 
funds can also respond to the investment opportunities, and therefore the market 
valuations, of a foreign country that might differ from the domestic. In general, larger 
deal values are positively associated with the possibility of a deal being a cross-border 
deal (Cao et al., 2014) implying that larger funds engage more in cross-border investing. 
This further suggests that limited fund size can be a reason for a private equity firm not 
to go international. 
Second, as general partners who have raised large funds are likely skilled and 
experienced, they have knowledge about carrying out transactions in different 
environments and with different stakeholders. This knowledge may also include 
knowledge required to operate in a foreign country. Larger firms often manage larger 
funds with a higher number of executives and the ability to provide more intensity for 
monitoring investments. Firms with less human resources need more time to gain the 
required knowledge and to compete with existing local players. Larger funds are not that 
dependent on local help and have the capacity to invest in foreign environments. 
(Meuleman & Wright, 2011) 
                                                 
2 The relationship between fund size and returns has been found to be U-shaped with returns starting to 
decrease when fund size grows very high (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Ljungqvist & Richardson, 2003; 
Robinson & Sensoy, 2016). This is due to very large funds being raised during boom times (Kaplan & 
Schoar, 2005) leading to “money chasing deals”, increased competition, and significantly high valuations 
limiting the number of favorable investment opportunities (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Ljungqvist et al., 
2007). In this study, the boom time effect is controlled for with vintage fixed effects. 
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As large fund size positively affects fund performance and larger funds are better aligned 
for cross-border investing, large funds’ performance in cross-border environments is 
expected to provide a moderating effect. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the fund size with a high share of cross-
border investments in a fund, the higher the performance of the fund. 
2.5.3 Private equity club deals, local offices, cross-border investments and fund 
performance 
Cross-border deals involve challenges for private equity firms because the knowledge 
required in foreign environments differs from that acquired in domestic markets 
(Dunning, 1993; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Private equity investing calls for special 
skills from the investors in international environments (Wright et al., 2005). Given the 
special knowledge and skill requirements involved in cross-border investing, managing 
the local environment by working with partners is the main motivation for firms to form 
alliances (Hitt et al., 2000). A weak, foreign institutional environment can be difficult for 
firms to deal with. Teaming up with local firms can provide foreign investors with access 
to resources and networks, knowledge about local operations, and deal flow, that can 
mitigate the challenges of less developed environments (Bruton et al., 2005). 
Consequently, these types of syndicated deals take place more commonly in countries 
with weak regulatory environment (Cao et al., 2014). 
In a club deal, local investors can play a critical role in certifying and attracting potential 
deals, and by being able to better provide monitoring and value-increasing activities due 
to the closer location (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Therefore, syndicating with local 
investors can lead to better screening and quality sourcing of deals, further converting 
into successful investments and better performance for the fund. On the other hand, 
syndicated deals are not as often cross-border deals as they are domestic deals (Cao et al., 
2014). Given the agency costs involved with syndication (Meuleman et al., 2009), private 
equity investors might be better off investing alone as long as they have the required 
knowledge. This further affirms the assumptions that sophisticated private equity 
investors engage in club deals only when superior returns are available. 
Due to improved monitoring and value-adding capability, club deals have been found to 
perform better in terms of financial return and accounting performance than sole-
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sponsored deals, as exceptional deals attract multiple investors (Guo et al., 2011). 
Different investors have different skillsets and information, and can therefore bring in 
specialized value-adding capability to the managing of the investment (Brander et al., 
2002). In addition to the improved company performance, syndication affects returns 
through prices paid. As multiple private equity firms form alliance, competition for 
bidding is limited either through collusion or merely reduced number of investors 
improving the buyers’ bargaining position and decreasing premiums paid (Cao et al., 
2014; Officer et al., 2010). Furthermore, club deals can allow for better terms for leverage 
as multiple investors may appear more attractive for debt financiers (Officer et al., 2010). 
In a cross-border setting, these effects are likely more acute due to the differences in firm 
capabilities across locations. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the share of club deals in a fund with a high 
share of cross-border investments, the higher the fund performance. 
Firms can learn about a foreign markets’ institutional and investing environment, and 
reduce information asymmetries, by building connections and networks through 
collaboration with local partners (Bruton et al., 2005) and by gaining direct investing 
experience in a specific country. On the other hand, firms can build absorptive learning 
capacity and knowledge that is more accurate by establishing a local office in a country 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Having a local office can also reduce the need to rely on local partners, which might 
benefit the firm as syndication has its costs (Meuleman et al., 2009). Local office can be 
more effective than syndicates in that it provides more flexibility and allows for staying 
consistent with the firm’s investing strategies. In a cross-border deal, having a local office 
and a local team carrying out the investment process can help tackle the idiosyncrasies of 
a foreign market and lead to higher returns through improved investment selection and 
monitoring. The presence of a local office has been found to mitigate the negative effects 
of cultural distance (Hammer et al., 2018). It is expected that the effect of cross-border 
share on fund performance increases with the level of local office deal share. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the share of local office deals in a fund with 
a high share of cross-border investments, the higher the fund 
performance. 
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3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The empirical part of this thesis uses quantitative analysis methods to test and validate 
the foregoing hypotheses, and to help answer the research question. These are examined 
in the context of European buyout funds, with vintages from 2000 to 2010, performing 
domestic and cross-border investing. European funds provide an interesting testing 
ground since most of their investments occur within Europe, which features a great 
variety of institutional frameworks (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). The buyout investments 
to European based targets accounted for a third of the total investment value globally in 
2017, only falling 10 percentage points short to US-based targets (MacArthur et al., 
2018). The number of European private equity firms grew significantly from 1990 until 
the financial crisis in 2007, as indicated by Figure 5 in chapter 2.1.2. 
Table 3 provides an overview of the investments made by European buyout funds with 
vintages from 2000 to 2010 based on the general partner location. The investments are 
reported based on the general partner headquarter location although investments might 
have been done through local branches. UK-based general partners are clearly the most 
active investors with over 50 % of investments in the data originating from the UK. The 
peak in the number of investments is reached in 2007 followed by a significant drop. This 
is consistent with that a private equity boom cycle ended that year (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2009) and a financial crisis followed. 
The buyout fund data and the deals made by the funds are obtained from the data sources 
of Preqin. Preqin was founded in 2003 and provides financial data, information and 
research on the alternative assets market as well as tools to support portfolio management, 
valuation, and reporting. Their data covers the asset classes of private equity, venture 
capital, hedge funds, private debt, real estate, infrastructure, natural resources, and 
secondaries. The data types comprise of fundraising, investors, performance, dry powder, 
assets under management, and deal flow. They also publish research reports based on 
their data and contributions from investment professionals.
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Table 3: Distribution of investments by general partner location 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 12 
Denmark 1 3 1 1 4 7 7 14 5 5 4 4 11 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 74 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 8 17 6 8 17 8 3 3 3 0 2 0 0 84 
France 8 8 14 19 30 70 88 70 56 37 65 57 52 18 25 29 18 9 7 1 681 
Germany 4 2 5 4 6 7 10 17 14 2 9 8 1 4 2 1 3 1 0 0 100 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
Italy 0 1 1 3 5 8 14 15 19 4 6 3 7 5 4 9 7 5 5 0 121 
Jersey 0 5 4 6 11 10 21 23 13 2 25 28 15 10 5 6 12 8 9 2 215 
Luxembourg 0 0 2 5 3 4 7 4 4 3 5 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 
Netherlands 1 8 2 5 6 14 22 16 11 8 15 9 4 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 125 
Norway 0 2 1 3 5 6 8 15 12 8 8 10 5 7 2 1 0 4 0 0 97 
Poland 2 3 0 9 5 11 10 12 12 10 13 17 5 5 3 3 2 1 2 0 125 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 3 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 14 
Spain 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 7 3 11 10 8 3 6 4 2 0 0 1 0 63 
Sweden 1 6 6 13 19 29 32 35 13 17 29 30 10 16 13 3 5 4 2 0 283 
Switzerland 3 2 4 0 5 7 10 9 13 5 15 15 14 15 2 5 1 0 0 0 125 
Turkey 0 0 0 2 0 3 4 1 6 1 2 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 24 
UK 20 35 82 126 169 213 266 317 194 111 207 265 186 121 98 63 36 25 18 3 2 555 
Total 41 75 122 196 268 391 514 568 397 232 425 483 326 218 167 129 91 59 44 6 4 752 
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The Preqin databases are used to extract two kind of information. Firstly, all buyout funds 
with vintages from 2000 to 2010, where the general partner location is listed in Europe, 
are exported from the Fund Performance Analyst Tool. The original data set includes 619 
funds and is narrowed down to 287 funds that report any performance data as of March 
31 2019. The follow-up period is chosen to be the most up-do-date available in order to 
maximize the number of most accurate reported performances, i.e. actual realized returns 
for limited partners. Secondly, all deals completed between the beginning of 2000 and 
March 31 2019 are extracted from the Buyout Deals Analyst Tool. The initial download 
yields 94 413 deals, which are then cross-referenced with the buyout funds. This operation 
gives the final number of deals of 4 752.3 
All the deals are then marked whether or not they are cross-border deals and if a given 
deal is syndicated. This information is aggregated on the fund level to get the share of 
cross-border investments and share of syndicated deals for each fund. Out of the 287 
funds, 17 did not have any deals in the deals data and are thus removed. Since net IRR is 
chosen as the measure of performance in this study, the data is further filtered to only 
include funds for which net IRR measure is available.4 Therefore, the final sample 
consists of 226 funds managed by 122 private equity firms. However, to mitigate selection 
bias and to increase the validity and reliability of the study, the lastly removed funds are 
embedded into the analysis using the Heckman correction method, which is further 
explained in chapter3.3.3. 
For defining a cross-border investment, the approach following earlier research (Buchner, 
Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2018; Cao et al., 2014; Hammer et al., 2018; 
Meuleman & Wright, 2011) is taken. A deal is defined to be a cross-border deal if the 
headquarters of the private equity firm and the target company reside in different 
countries. On the other hand, many, especially bigger, private equity firms have offices 
in multiple countries and the local team most likely executes the deals the firm makes in 
these countries. To account for this, data on the firms’ global offices is hand-collected 
from current and historical snapshots of company websites, news articles and Invest 
                                                 
3 The deals downloaded from Preqin are reported by investor. This means that in case of a syndication, a 
deal with the same buyout ID appears multiple times in the data set. In other words, the deals are not unique 
on the deal level but rather on deal-investor level. 
4 Net IRR is the least available performance measures available for funds in Preqin most likely because it 
relies on specific inflow and outflow dates. Other performance measures reported include Called-up capital, 
Distribution to Paid-In, Residual Value to Paid-In, and Multiple of Invested Capital. 
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Europe directories. A deal is defined to be a local office deal if the target is outside the 
firm’s headquarter country but the firm has an office in the country and the office was in 
operation before or on the same year as the transaction occured. A deal is a pure office 
deal if it is a cross-border deal and the firm did not have a local office in the country at 
the year of the investment. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of deals by portfolio company location. The first column 
shows counts and shares for all deals, the second for all cross-border deals and the third 
for cross-border deals made to countries where the private equity firm has a local office. 
Similar to the deal counts by investor location, majority of deals are made to the UK, 
while France, US, Germany and Sweden follow. On the other hand, the UK does not fit 
into top 10 in cross-border deals, which suggests that most of the deals made in the UK 
are domestic deals. Cross-border deals tend to flow to the US where also most of the local 
office deals are made. Other frequent cross-border deals are made to Germany and France. 
Most of the countries with a high number of cross-border deals have greater share of local 
office deals than pure cross-border deals, which indicates that firms look to operate 
through the local branch. 
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3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Variable overview 
Descriptions of the dependent, independent and control variables used in the analysis are 
summarized in Table 5. Each variable and a brief definition is given in the table. A further 
explanation for each variable follows. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of deals by target company location 
Target country All deals  Cross-border deals  Local office deals 
 N %  N %  N % 
UK 1 190 25.0 %  60 2.5 %  26 2.3 % 
France 724 15.2 %  267 11.0 %  168 14.7 % 
US 440 9.3 %  440 18.2 %  277 24.3 % 
Germany 371 7.8 %  293 12.1 %  209 18.3 % 
Sweden 324 6.8 %  183 7.6 %  117 10.2 % 
Italy 264 5.6 %  154 6.4 %  49 4.3 % 
Netherlands 191 4.0 %  116 4.8 %  26 2.3 % 
Other 175 3.7 %  172 7.1 %  40 3.5 % 
Spain 161 3.4 %  108 4.5 %  47 4.1 % 
Norway 132 2.8 %  80 3.3 %  27 2.4 % 
Denmark 130 2.7 %  79 3.3 %  30 2.6 % 
Finland 108 2.3 %  53 2.2 %  18 1.6 % 
Poland 97 2.0 %  27 1.1 %  17 1.5 % 
Switzerland 82 1.7 %  64 2.6 %  7 0.6 % 
Belgium 66 1.4 %  62 2.6 %  25 2.2 % 
Canada 46 1.0 %  46 1.9 %  0 0.0 % 
Turkey 35 0.7 %  12 0.5 %  1 0.1 % 
China 30 0.6 %  30 1.2 %  11 1.0 % 
Australia 29 0.6 %  29 1.2 %  1 0.1 % 
Czech Republic 28 0.6 %  28 1.2 %  13 1.1 % 
India 26 0.5 %  26 1.1 %  17 1.5 % 
Ireland 25 0.5 %  25 1.0 %  0 0.0 % 
Romania 23 0.5 %  23 1.0 %  10 0.9 % 
Austria 20 0.4 %  20 0.8 %  0 0.0 % 
Luxembourg 18 0.4 %  18 0.7 %  6 0.5 % 
Russia 17 0.4 %  4 0.2 %  0 0.0 % 
Total 4 752 100 %  2 419 100 %  1 142 100 % 
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Table 5: Summary of variables used in the regressions 
Variables Definition 
Dependent variable  
Net IRR The net IRR reported in Preqin as of Mar 31 2019 by a particular 
fund  
  
Independent variables  
Cross-border investment share The number of cross-border deals relative to the total number of 
deals made by a fund  
Cross-continent investment share The number of cross-continent deals relative to total number of 
deals made by a fund  
  
Control variables  
Fund size Logarithm of the value of the fund in EUR as reported by Preqin 
Club deal share The number of syndicated deals divided by the number of all 
deals in the fund  
Local office share The number of cross-border investments to countries where the 
private equity firm has a local office divided by the total number 
of investments made by the fund  
Country experience The average number of investments a firm has made in a country 
three years prior to a given investment. The average is based on 
all investments by a fund, including domestic.  
Specialization The sum of squared shares of a fund’s investments to a specific 
industry. The industry classification includes 9 industries.  
Vintage dummies Dummy variables representing vintage years 
 
3.2.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the analysis is continuous and provides a measure of a fund’s 
performance. More specifically, the variable is the net of fees IRR available for limited 
partners reported in percentages and extracted from Preqin Fund Performance Analyst 
Tool. For liquidated funds, the value provides an actual measure of the realized return to 
the limited partners, while funds that have yet not fully divested their investments rely on 
interim IRRs. The interim IRRs have been found to provide sufficiently accurate 
measures of the performance (see Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015). Net IRR is widely used as a 
fund’s performance measure by industry practitioners as well as academics (Diller & 
Kaserer, 2009; Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005), and is 
therefore a well-suited dependent variable in this study. 
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3.2.3 Independent variables 
Cross-border investment share 
To study the effect of cross-border investments on fund performance, a measure of cross-
border investment share in a fund is employed as an independent variable. The measure 
is straightforward and easy to calculate from the data extracted from Preqin’s Buyout 
Deal Analyst Tool and by matching the investments with each fund. The value for the 
variable is calculated as the number of cross-border investments, that is, investments 
where the target’s location is in a different country than the investor firm’s location,5 
made by a fund divided by the total number of deals of the fund. The variable therefore 
gets values between [0, 1]. The variable is named Cross-border share. 
Cross-continent investment share 
To further test the effect of geographical location in the cross-border share, a measure of 
the level of cross-continent investments in a fund is used as an independent variable. 
Distance might be an interesting factor in European private equity since most of the 
investments are done within Europe where the distances are not as significant. To 
calculate the cross-continent investment share, the seven-continent model is used. Similar 
to the cross-border investment share, the Cross-continent share is the share of cross-
continent investments by a fund relative to all investments made by the fund. Again, the 
variable gets values between [0, 1]. 
3.2.4 Control variables 
Fund size 
A measure of Fund size is included to test hypothesis 2. The fund values are reported in 
Preqin’s buyout fund data and the values in euros are included in this study. Due to the 
values having a significantly wide and skewed range, a logarithm of the fund sizes is 
taken. Fund size has been found to be one of the key fund-level drivers for fund 
performance (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009; Robinson & 
Sensoy, 2016) and larger funds are often managed by skilled general partners and bigger 
firms, who have access to better resources and are not limited by capital constraints 
                                                 
5 The locations of the private equity investor and the target are those observed in Preqin’s data and for the 
investor, the location is always the location of the headquarters/primary office. Therefore, the data does not 
take into account whether the investment was done through a local branch. 
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(Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009). This can be particularly 
important in a cross-border context where a larger firm might be better able to succeed 
independently (Brander et al., 2002). Therefore, fund size is also included as a moderator 
on cross-border share. 
Club deals 
Club deals, or syndication, are also included as a control and a moderator variable to test 
hypothesis 3. It is calculated as the share of syndicated deals in a fund relative to all 
investments in the fund. A deal is defined as a club deal if it appears multiple times in the 
deals data and the investor firms in these other observations are found on Preqin’s Fund 
Manager Export.6 The variable gets values between [0, 1]. Club deals have implications 
on prices and premiums, deal selection, and attraction of debt that positively affect returns 
(Cao et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2011; Officer et al., 2010), therefore making it a relevant 
control variable. 
Furthermore, syndication can be an important factor in tackling information asymmetries, 
idiosyncrasies, and limited knowledge of a foreign market (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
The calculation of the variable includes all types of investments made by the fund, even 
add-ons. Add-ons are a good strategy for internationalizing a portfolio company’s 
business and the help of a local partner can be valuable in the process internationalization 
(Mäkelä & Maula, 2005). In addition, internationalization is a process of learning 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), which helps the private equity firm to operate in foreign 
markets (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Thus, Club deal share is added as a moderator for 
cross-border share’s effect on fund performance.   
Local office 
Many private equity firms, especially bigger and older ones, have established operations 
outside their headquarter country in the form of local offices. A private equity firm can 
learn about a foreign market, build connections and networks in it and appear as a more 
credible and trustworthy partner when it has a local office in the target company’s host 
country (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). This, in turn, reduces the challenges related to 
cross-border transactions and can positively affect the value-adding capability and the 
implied returns. Therefore, the number of companies’ real cross-border deals, i.e. deals 
                                                 
6 This is to make sure the syndicate firms are private equity general partners. 
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where the target company is in a country where the private equity firm does not have a 
local office, is reduced. 
In order to control for the effect of deals made to countries with a local office, a variable 
Local office share is added. It is calculated as the sum of investments made by a fund to 
countries where the general partner has a local office, excluding investments to the 
headquarter country, divided by the number of all investments made by the fund. The 
measure gets a value of zero when a fund has no cross-border investments to countries 
with a local office and a value of one if all the fund’s investments are cross-border deals 
to countries with a local office. As a local office can alleviate the challenges in cross-
border settings, the effect of cross-border share is assumed to be positively moderated by 
high local office share. Therefore, local office is also added as a moderator on cross-
border share to test hypothesis 4. 
Country experience 
In respect of internationalization and learning country-specific knowledge, a control 
variable Experience, measuring general partners’ investing experience in a specific 
country, is added (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). To also capture how recent the knowledge 
and the built connections are in a country, the variable is calculated as the number of 
investments the private equity firm has made to a certain country, that is outside of the 
firm’s headquarter location, during a three-year period prior to a given investment. These 
values are then summed up and an average based on all deals of the fund is taken to obtain 
a fund-level measure. A logarithm of the measure is taken due to the skewness in the 
values. 
Private equity firms might be able to tackle the institutional and informational barriers 
raised in cross-border investing settings through learning and expanding activities across 
borders is a process of gaining knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). By investing in a 
certain country, firms learn, acquire knowledge and build their networks through which 
they demonstrate absorptive capacity while processing investment opportunities (De 
Clercq & Dimov, 2008). Therefore, private equity firms can benefit from doing repeated  
deals in a particular country (Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Liu & Maula, 2016). Although 
partly similar learning may be acquired through syndication, a private equity firm may be 
better off investing alone in order to obtain a majority share of the target and due to the 
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risks and costs related to syndication (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Thus, country level 
experience is important to take into account and is included as a control variable. 
Specialization 
Different private equity firms have different skills and information (Brander et al., 2002) 
and these skills might be industry-specific. Private equity firms, therefore, often follow a 
certain strategy and focus on particular sectors in order to exploit their knowledge. By 
having a high degree of specialization, and therefore playing to their strengths, private 
equity firms can have the ability to obtain competitive advantage, increase the 
performance of their portfolio companies and succeed better (Cressy et al., 2007; 
Gompers et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, different industries are exposed to systematic risks and the economic 
performance of industries is dependent on different forces (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). 
Finance theories, starting from Markowitz, suggest that through diversified portfolio 
selection, the risk can be reduced without reducing the expected returns. Therefore, a 
private equity firms may look to invest in various industries in order to diversify their 
portfolio and hedge themselves from the systematic risk. Diversification has also induced 
firms to syndicate (Manigart et al., 2006). Thus, industry specialization is controlled for 
in the study to capture its possible effects on fund returns. 
The industry specialization index, Specialization, for a fund is calculated by applying the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman method, which is a common measure of market concentration. For 
each fund, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is obtained by squaring the share of 
investments a fund has made to a specific industry and then summing these results. In 
theory, the measure can get values from close to zero, up to 10 000. As the calculation 
provides highly skewed values, a logarithm is taken to obtain the final value. The industry 
classes used, and their sub-industries, are listed in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Industry classification and sub-industries 
Environment, 
Energy and Utilities 
Consumer goods, 
Food and Retail 
Healthcare Industrials Information 
Technology 
Materials Services Telecoms, Media 
and 
Communications 
Other 
Clean Technology Beverages Biomedical Aerospace Computer Services Agriculture Business Services Advertising Beverages 
Energy Consumer Products Biotechnology Construction Electronics Chemicals Consumer Services Communications Consumer Products 
Environmental 
Services 
Food Healthcare Defence Gaming Materials Education / Training Digital Media Food 
Infrastructure Retail Healthcare IT Distribution Hardware Mining Entertainment Information 
Services 
Gambling 
Oil & Gas  Medical Devices Engineering High-Tech Natural Resources Financial Services Marketing Hotels and Offices 
Power  Medical Instruments Industrial Internet Production Insurance Media Leisure 
Renewable Energy  Medical 
Technologies 
Logistics IT Timber Outsourcing Telecom Media Property 
Utilities  Pharmaceuticals Manufacturing IT Infrastructure  
 
Telecoms Publishing 
 
 
 
Shipping IT Security 
   
Restaurants 
 
 
 
Transportation Network 
   
Retail 
 
 
  
Semiconductors  
   
 
 
  
Software 
    
 
 
  
Technology  
   
 
 
  
Wireless 
    
 52 
Vintage 
The overall equity market affects fund returns with funds raised during boom times 
performing worse than those raised in downturns (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005). High market 
valuations clearly affect the prices private equity firms are able to buy and sell their 
investments for, which can affect the fund returns if most of the investments are made 
when valuations are high. More specifically, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that funds 
raised when markets are high are less likely to raise a follow-on fund, and that the ability 
to raise a follow-on fund is a good proxy of fund performance. A hot private equity market 
attracts capital commitments which has also been associated with poor performance 
(Harris, Jenkinson, & Kaplan, 2014; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
The sample period of fund vintages, 2000 to 2010, used in this study falls over a critical 
financial crisis and an ending of a private equity boom cycle (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). 
The cost of debt was particularly favorable prior to 2007, which may have an effect on 
fund returns through the increased leveraging activity and consequential high pricing 
(Axelson et al., 2013). Therefore, it is important to control for the years the funds are 
raised and try to capture the effect that timing has on fund performance. Vintage year 
dummy variables are added to the analyses. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Linear regression analysis 
The hypotheses testing procedure in this thesis uses regression analysis to study the 
relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. More specifically, 
since the dependent variable is a continuous outcome and there are more than one 
independent and control variables, multiple linear regression model is used to analyze the 
determinants of fund performance. Linear regression is a statistical method that models 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables and can be 
used for prediction purposes as well as explaining past relationship between variables. 
The relationship is established by calculating a best fitting line, a linear equation, to the 
observed data. A multiple linear regression equation can be mathematically expressed as 
follows: 
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y =    +   x  +   x  + ⋯ +   x  + ϵ , 
where y is the dependent variable, x …  are the independent variables,     is a constant or 
the intercept of the line,   …  are coefficients of the independent variables, and ϵ is an 
error term. 
The values for the betas,   …  in the above formula, can be obtained using a least square 
method. Here, the fitting regression is calculated by summing the squares of the 
deviations of each data point to the line. The squaring process eliminates the effect of 
observations falling on opposite sides of the line. Multiple linear regression analysis is 
subject to a few assumptions. Firstly, as the name suggests, the analysis requires that there 
exists a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The analysis 
is also sensitive to outliers in data. Secondly, it is required that the residuals of the 
regression, i.e. the errors between the predicted and observed values, are normally 
distributed. Finally, the data should not suffer from multicollinearity. This occurs when 
independent variables correlate strongly with each other. 
The results of the analysis are based on the significance of each variable and the values 
of the beta coefficients. The significance of variables are tested using a t-test, where the 
null hypothesis is that a coefficient equals zero, i.e. it has no effect on the dependent 
variable. If the variable is significant, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the changes 
in the values of the variable are related to the changes in the dependent variable. The beta 
coefficients values, on the other hand, represent a mean change in the dependent variable 
for a one-unit change in the independent variable and when the values of other variables 
are kept constant. They, therefore, provide the magnitude and the direction effect of 
independent variables on the dependent variable. 
3.3.2 Effect of moderating relationships 
To analyze the moderating effect fund size, club deals and local office deals have on the 
relationship between cross-border share and fund performance, and to test hypothesis 2 
to 4, interaction variables are needed. Interaction variables are calculated as the product 
of the independent and the moderating variable. Mathematically a multiple linear 
regression model with the interaction term can be expressed as follows: 
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y =    +   x  +   x  +   x x  + ϵ , 
where y is the dependent variable, x  and x  are the independent variables, x x  is the 
interaction variable,   …  are the beta coefficients and ϵ is the error term. 
3.3.3 Robustness tests 
Selection bias and Heckman correction 
Due to the nature of private equity being, namely, private, the practitioners and related 
stakeholders are not bounded by the same reporting requirements as public entities. This 
includes the information on fund returns and other performance measures of the funds, as 
reporting returns of non-liquidated funds is subjective (Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015) and, 
more importantly, voluntary. The availability of data, or the lack thereof, poses risks of 
selection bias in private equity research (see e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005, for discussion) 
when the desired performance metric is not available for the full sample population. This 
study is no different in that the data consists of only those funds who have reported the 
net IRR figures that might not be a random sample of the full population. 
Since the objective of this study is to find evidence on how different cross-border 
investment shares affect the relative performance across funds, rather than reporting the 
absolute performances of the funds as outcomes, it might not be biased by 
abovementioned selection of funds. Although the selected funds might have superior 
performance compared to the normal values of the population, the relative effect of cross-
border share might still be consistent. 
Nevertheless, to account for possible selection bias and to increase the robustness of the 
study, a Heckman correction method for mitigating sample selection bias is used 
(Heckman, 1979). It is used also in prior private equity research (Cumming & Walz, 2010; 
Gompers & Lerner, 2000). Heckman correction method is a statistical technique taking 
place in two stages. In this case, the process first models the selection by estimating the 
probability that the performance of a fund is included in the sample, and then adds a 
function of these probabilities into the original regression formula as a variable. 
In the first stage, the estimation of the probability should be based on factors that affect 
the likelihood for a fund to report their net IRR figures. Since funds’ net cash flows tend 
to follow a J-curve so that real fund returns are realized later in the funds’ lifecycle, and 
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therefore younger funds may show poor results, the number of deals made by the fund is 
used as the first estimator. When experiencing poor performance, private equity funds 
may not be as keen to report their return measures. Although a follow-up period of more 
than eight years is used to allow time for the funds analyzed in this study to realize actual 
returns, funds can have a contractual life of up to 13 years and excess returns are not 
shown until the very end of a fund’s life (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Ljungqvist & 
Richardson, 2003). A small number of deals can signal that the fund is still immature of 
that it is struggling with deal flow. 
Secondly, as experienced and skilled fund managers are more likely to perform better and 
fund size is used as a proxy of general partner skill (Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009), fund 
size is used as another estimator. Inexperienced private equity firms are more likely to 
engage in riskier investments due to pressure of fundraising (Ljungqvist et al., 2007) and 
might be hesitant to report their IRR figures. 
Outliers and influential observations 
The regression models used in the analyses of this thesis are tested for possible outlier 
and high influence points that can affect the fit of the models. Preliminary tests on 
normality with Q-Q plots, outliers with standardized residuals and hat values, and 
influential points with leverage and Cook’s distance values and plots reveal that a few 
outlier and influential observations are present in the data. For example, one fund reports 
a net IRR value of 240 %, which is significantly greater than any other value. This value 
does not represent a common real-life IRR return for a buyout fund, and can therefore be 
a reporting mistake. To account for the skewness in the values, a method of winsorization 
is used. Winsorization balances out the most extreme points by bringing all values above 
and below the 95 and 5 % percentiles, respectively, to the percentile values. Since the aim 
is to study the relative relationship between fund performance and cross-border share, and 
not absolute return values, winsorization of the return data can be justified. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
The total sample consists of 226 European buyout funds with vintages between 2000 and 
2010 and reported net IRR information as of March 31 2019. The sample with Heckman 
correction adds a selection of 44 funds forming an expanded sample of 270 funds. These 
funds made a total of 4 752 investments and are managed by 146 private equity firms. 
Out of the deals, 2 419 were cross-border deals and 670 were cross-continent. In 47 % 
(1 142) of the cross-border deals, the private equity firm had a local office in the target’s 
country. 
The summary statistics for the fund performance, the cross-border shares and the control 
variables are shown in Table 7. The average net IRR across the 226 funds is 18.35 % and 
the median is 13.95 %. These numbers are very well aligned with those of Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) at around 18 % and 13 %, while 
slightly higher than the around 13 % and 11 % reported by Diller and Kaserer (2009). 
However, these studies are mostly focused on funds raised earlier and the first two papers 
focus on US firms. The standard deviation in the sample is relatively high almost 21 %, 
which can be explained by the wide spread in the values ranging from around -12 % to 
almost 240 %. 
Table 7: Sample description 
  N Mean Std.Dev Median Min Max 
Net IRR 226 18.35 20.62 13.95 -12.2 239.8 
       
Independent variables       
Cross-border share 270 0.41 0.36 0.33 0 1 
Cross-continent share 270 0.10 0.19 0 0 1 
       
Control variables       
Fund size 270 991.13 1 669.58 338.49 5.51 11 204.3 
Club deal share 270 0.20 0.23 0.13 0 1 
Local office share 270 0.16 0.25 0 0 0.93 
Experience 270 0.92 1.82 0.12 0 16.34 
Specialization 270 3 319.36 1 777.39 2 782.85 1 379.96 10 000 
Vintage 270 2005.17 2.79 2006 2000 2010 
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The mean cross-border share, i.e. the number of cross-border deals relative to the total 
number of deals made by a fund, is 0.41 and the median is 0.33, while for cross-continent 
share the values drop to 0.10 and zero. This suggests that in an average fund, a 
considerable share of investment are made outside the firm’s headquarter country and that 
European firms mostly operate in Europe. However, based on the standard deviations, 
these values tend to vary significantly. 
In addition, the fund sizes have a very broad range from as small as 5.5 MEUR up to 
11 204 MEUR. The average fund size across the sample is 991 MEUR and the median is 
338 MEUR. Because of the broad range, the standard deviation is also large at 1 700 
MEUR. For club deal and local office shares, the mean values are 0.20 and 0.16 
respectively. 
Table 8 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent, independent and 
continuous control variables used in the regression analyses. Some of the correlations 
between the variables appear to be high. To account for this, the regressions are tested for 
possible multicollinearity issues using variance inflation factors. In addition, the 
independent variables, i.e. cross-border and cross-continent shares and the interaction 
terms, are included in different regression models. 
Table 8: Pearson correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Net IRR 1.00        
2. Cross-border share -0.07 1.00       
3. Cross-continent share 0.02 0.50 1.00      
4. Log(Fund size) -0.26 0.55 0.33 1.00     
5. Club deal share 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.05 1.00    
6. Local office share 0.02 0.70 0.41 0.46 0.14 1.00   
7. Experience -0.09 0.75 0.41 0.53 0.14 0.79 1.00  
8. Specialization 0.10 -0.13 -0.12 -0.43 0.12 -0.28 -0.32 1.00 
 
4.1.2 Fund and deal characteristics 
The fund size data is visualized further in Figure 8. The histogram shows that the fund 
sizes are skewed towards the lower end of the scale with about 60 % of funds having a 
funds size less than 500 MEUR. This is in line with Diller and Kaserer (2009) whose 
average fund size for buyout funds is 320 MEUR. On the other, in this study the average 
and median fund sizes are considerably larger, which is affected by the total of about 25 
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% of funds being bigger than 1 billion EUR. It should be noted that Diller and Kaserer’s 
(2009) sample includes much older vintages and private equity industry has grown 
significantly thereafter. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of funds by fund size 
There is also some variation in the industry focus of funds as shown in Figure 9. Majority 
of funds, 85 %, invested in the industrials sector. This is followed by the consumer goods, 
food and retail sector as well as the services sector. Over 50 % of funds also invested in 
the information technology and healthcare sectors. The least invested sector was materials 
with 31 %. The distribution suggests that at least not many funds focus solely on one 
sector. 
 
Figure 9: Percentage of funds investing in different industries 
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The distribution of funds by fund vintage year is shown in Figure 10. The private equity 
boom years can clearly be noticed in the figure with most the highest number of funds 
raised between 2005 and 2007 with a rapid decline thereafter. Surprisingly, there is a 
decline in the number of funds in 2004 without any clear explanation. Perhaps, the end of 
the industry boom made it difficult for these funds to exit their later investments lowering 
their returns, and therefore made the funds reluctant to report performance measures. 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of funds by vintage year 
Consistently with the deals data described in chapter 3.1, firms headquartered in the UK 
manage the greatest share, 44 %, of funds. The second and third biggest shares are for 
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Figure 11: Percentage of funds by fund headquarter location 
The quantities of different types of investments by fund vintage year are depicted in 
Figure 12. The overall quantities reflect the fundraising and the buyout industry with most 
of the investments made by funds with vintages around 2006. For each year, most 
investments made by the funds are buyouts, while the share of buyouts is smaller around 
the hot years. This suggests that during the boom years it might have been difficult to find 
reasonably priced buyout deals or that there was excess capital due to large capital 
inflows. Add-ons represent the second largest investment type each year. 
 
Figure 12: Number of investments by fund vintage for different investment types 
The shares of domestic, pure cross-border and local office deals for each fund vintage are 
visualized in Figure 13. The results show some variation but no significant observations 
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can be made. The share of domestic deals is lowest for the 2006 vintage while it 
significantly grows in 2010. 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of domestic, cross-border and local office investments by vintage year 
Figure 14 shows the number of domestic, pure cross-border and local office deals for 
different investment types. Majority of deals in all categories are buyouts but the share is 
significantly largest in domestic deals. The smallest share of buyouts is in pure cross-
border deals. This suggests that funds invest in buyouts in the countries where they have 
operations, through a headquarters or a local office, and do cross-border add-ons while 
looking to grow their portfolio companies internationally. 
 
Figure 14: Number of investments by domestic, cross-border and local office deals for different investment types 
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The number of domestic, pure cross-border and local office deals for different fund sizes 
are depicted in Figure 15. The total number of investments is highest for funds between 
250 and 500 MEUR. In addition, the number of investments does not decrease with the 
fund size but rather decreases suggesting that bigger fund sizes probably focus on larger 
deals. The share of domestic deals, however, decreases while fund size grows. This is 
intuitive as larger funds are more likely to be managed by larger firms that operate in 
many countries. The larger share of local office deals with the larger funds supports this 
observation. 
 
Figure 15: Number of domestic, cross-border and local office deals by fund size 
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of club deals by general partner headquarter location are shown in Figure 16. The highest 
share of cross-border deals are made by general partners located in Jersey, Switzerland 
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Figure 16: Percentage of domestic, pure cross-border, local office and club deals 
Finally, the share of sole-sponsored investments and club deals for domestic, pure cross-
border and local office deals are shown in Figure 17. The share of sole-sponsored deals 
is highest for domestic deals and lower for cross-border deals, which is in line with the 
theory that firms might benefit from syndication when investing across borders. On the 
other hand, the highest share of club deals is for local office investments. This could be 
induced by firms wanting to bring in specialized competence in their non-headquarter 
locations.  
 
Figure 17: Percentage of club deals by domestic, cross-border and local office investments 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
Domestic Pure cross-border Local office Club deal
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Domestic Pure cross-border Local office
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
in
v
es
tm
en
ts
Sole-sponsored Club deal
 64 
4.1.3 Fund performance relationships 
The following graphs visualize the relationships between fund performance metrics, i.e. 
the dependent variable, and the independent and moderator variables. Scatterplots are 
used since they can reveal initial effects about the relationship between two variables. 
Figure 18 scatterplots the funds’ net IRR until 100 % and the cross-border share. One 
observation has a net IRR of 240 %, with no cross-border investments, and is therefore 
excluded from the plot. The values in the figure are very much scattered and no clear 
trend can be observed. Even the negative IRR values are spread out between low and high 
levels of cross-border share. 
 
Figure 18: Fund IRR and cross-border share 
Figure 19 plots fund IRR against the natural logarithm value of fund size.7 Surprisingly, 
it seems that a slightly decreasing trend can be observed from the graph. On the other 
hand, there seems to be an upward trend from about a midway up of the scale, whereas 
the trend seems to be downward before the midway point. Most of the negative IRR 
values are scattered between five and seven of the logarithm of fund size. This suggests 
that there could be a convex relationship between the variables. Both of these 
observations are counterintuitive based on the theory discussed earlier. 
                                                 
7 The relationship was also tested with a base 10 logarithm with similar results. 
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Figure 19: Fund IRR and logarithm of fund size 
Next, Figure 20 shows the relationship between fund IRR and the fund club deal share. 
Here, many values are scattered in the lower left corner while values in the upper end of 
the scale seem to be somewhat higher. Therefore, a slight upward trend can be observed 
in the graph. However, no conclusions can be made due to the high number of 
observations being in the lower end of the scale and at the zero club deal share level. 
 
Figure 20: Fund IRR and club deal share 
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office investments. After this, the points seem to show an upward trend implying that a 
greater local office share could mean higher fund performance. 
 
Figure 21: Fund IRR and local office share 
Finally, Figure 22 gives a comparison for the performance measure and cross-border 
share as net multiple is used. This also expands the sample size to cover the whole 
Heckman selection and a total sample size of 270 funds. Here, the values are again very 
spread-out and no clear conclusions can be made. However, the values at the lower levels 
of cross-border share seem to be mostly slightly below those of the higher shares. This 
implies there may be a positive relationship between the cross-border share and net 
multiple. 
 
Figure 22: Fund net multiple and cross-border share 
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4.2 Regression analysis 
Table 9 presents the estimates for the effects and factors for the relationship between 
buyout fund performance and the level of cross-border investment share in the funds. 
Models 1 to 7 are estimated using OLS regression on the sample that has net IRR values 
reported. Model 8 corrects for possible selection bias using a two-stage Heckman sample 
selection method with the maximum likelihood algorithm. The dependent variable for all 
models is net IRR. The net IRR values are winsorized to the fifth and 95th percentiles. 
Due to some evidence of heteroscedasticity being present in the models, robust standard 
errors are reported and used when calculating significance tests. 
Model 1 in column (1) presents a base model including only the control variables. Out of 
the continuous variables, club deal share, specialization and country experience are not 
significant in explaining fund IRRs. Fund size is highly significant across all models but 
has a negative sign suggesting an inconsistency compared to prior research. The local 
office share is also significant in all models, where it is not included as a moderator, 
mostly at a 1 % level and has a positive coefficient that is relatively large. This implies 
that investing through a local office when operating across borders leads to better 
performance. In addition, all vintage dummies between 2005 and 2010 have negative 
signs and all are significant at least at a 5 % level. This is in line with private equity boom 
cycle ending, and funds raised around the time struggling with performance. 
Models 2 and 3 introduce the independent variables separately in order to account for 
correlation between the variables. Model 2 adds the main independent variable, cross-
border share, which has an opposite to expected sign but is not significant. In model 3, 
cross-continent share is added, which in turn is positive and significant. These results 
provide no direct support for hypothesis 1 but the significant and positive cross-continent 
share implies that there may be a positive relationship between distant investments and 
performance. 
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Models 4 to 6 introduce the moderator variables one by one with the cross-border share 
variable. In model 4, the fund size moderator has the expected sign and is significant, thus 
supporting hypothesis 2. Now also cross-border share is significant with a negative sign. 
The club deal share and local office share moderators in models 5 and 6 have the expected 
signs in line with hypothesis 3 and 4, respectively, but are not significant. In addition, the 
local office share control loses its significance when it is introduced as a moderator. 
Table 9: Regression results, main models 
Dependent variable = Net IRR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cross-border share  -1.61  -21.48* -3.53 -1.79 -24.46* -24.44* 
  (3.29)  (10.12) (3.52) (3.55) (10.18) (10.19) 
Cross-continent share   7.24*    6.11* 6.11* 
   (2.97)    (2.89) (2.89) 
Cross-border share x Fund size    3.58*   3.60* 3.60* 
    (1.57)   (1.59) (1.59) 
Cross-border share x Club deal share 
    6.94  8.95 8.94 
    (8.18)  (8.06) (8.06) 
Cross-border share x Local office 
share 
     3.13 -9.93 -9.92 
     (11.44) (12.04) (12.04) 
log(Fund size) -2.41*** -2.30*** -2.57*** -4.03*** -2.33*** -2.29*** -4.20*** -4.21*** 
 (0.52) (0.60) (0.52) (1.01) (0.61) (0.61) (1.08) (1.08) 
Club deal share -3.35 -3.14 -4.13 -4.26 -5.94 -3.15 -8.35 -8.35 
 (3.30) (3.26) (3.35) (3.36) (4.88) (3.25) (5.12) (5.12) 
Local office share 8.69** 9.34** 7.91* 8.62** 9.62** 6.57 17.47 17.47 
 (3.22) (3.44) (3.31) (3.24) (3.43) (11.01) (11.57) (11.57) 
Experience -0.88 -0.47 -1.36 -1.16 -0.43 -0.39 -1.52 -1.53 
 (1.36) (1.41) (1.42) (1.34) (1.37) (1.51) (1.43) (1.43) 
Specialization -1.53 -1.35 -1.42 -1.31 -1.46 -1.38 -1.17 -1.16 
 (1.80) (1.83) (1.79) (1.77) (1.79) (1.82) (1.74) (1.73) 
Vintage 2001 6.03† 6.01† 6.00† 6.70* 6.09† 6.07† 6.59† 6.59* 
 (3.59) (3.57) (3.47) (3.33) (3.66) (3.57) (3.35) (3.35) 
Vintage 2002 5.52† 5.52† 6.00† 6.83† 5.58† 5.54† 7.24* 7.24* 
 (3.28) (3.32) (3.25) (3.57) (3.29) (3.33) (3.53) (3.53) 
Vintage 2003 2.71 2.73 3.02 3.17 3.11 2.76 3.84 3.83 
 (3.66) (3.66) (3.65) (3.66) (3.72) (3.66) (3.69) (3.70) 
Vintage 2004 -0.56 -0.49 -0.14 -0.21 -0.26 -0.39 0.14 0.14 
 (3.77) (3.73) (3.74) (3.81) (3.75) (3.76) (3.87) (3.87) 
Vintage 2005 -7.13* -7.20* -6.77* -6.81* -7.09* -7.16* -6.53* -6.53* 
 (3.33) (3.33) (3.29) (3.28) (3.35) (3.33) (3.25) (3.26) 
Vintage 2006 -10.88*** -10.92*** -10.72*** -10.43*** -10.62*** -10.88*** -10.05*** -10.06*** 
 (2.38) (2.37) (2.35) (2.39) (2.46) (2.38) (2.47) (2.47) 
Vintage 2007 -12.43*** -12.51*** -12.15*** -12.11*** -12.22*** -12.50*** -11.55*** -11.56*** 
 (2.61) (2.61) (2.56) (2.62) (2.70) (2.61) (2.66) (2.66) 
Vintage 2008 -9.89*** -9.94*** -9.77*** -9.22*** -9.66*** -9.92*** -8.86*** -8.86*** 
 (2.41) (2.44) (2.33) (2.45) (2.53) (2.44) (2.50) (2.50) 
Vintage 2009 -7.06** -7.04** -6.66** -6.25* -6.62* -7.01** -5.46* -5.46* 
 (2.50) (2.51) (2.48) (2.59) (2.64) (2.49) (2.71) (2.71) 
Vintage 2010 -10.68** -10.75** -10.75** -9.61* -10.62** -10.75** -9.54* -9.55* 
 (3.62) (3.64) (3.60) (3.80) (3.66) (3.63) (3.86) (3.86)    
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 270     
R-squared 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.40  
OLS regression on the IRR reported sample only in models 1-7. Heckman sample selection in model 8. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05;  † p < 0.1. 
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Model 7 is the full model with all variables. Model 8 replicates model 7 but uses a 
Heckman sample selection model. The results between the two models are very similar. 
All the previously significant non-control variables retain their significance and signs.  
Overall, these observations provide mixed results. The general cross-border share seems 
to be negatively associated with fund performance providing opposite support for 
hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the cross-continent share has a positive effect providing 
partial support for hypothesis 1. Figure 23 shows the predicted values and confidence 
intervals of cross-border share (in Panel A) and cross-continent share (in Panel B), based 
on model 7. A move from no cross-border investments to all investments being cross-
border in a fund decreases net IRR by 2.6 %-points. The same effect for a unit change in 
cross-continent share is 6.1 %-points. Although the effect is larger for cross-continent 
share, so is the confidence interval with higher levels of cross-continent share due to fewer 
observations in that end. 
 
Figure 23: Predicted fund performance values and confidence intervals of cross-border and cross-continent shares 
Regarding other hypotheses, although the effect the constituent variable of fund size is 
negative, the interaction effect is positive supporting hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 3 and 4 
are not supported based on the insignificance of the variables. The interaction effect of 
fund size and cross-border share is further interpreted by analyzing the average marginal 
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effects of the term based on model 7 (Mize, 2019).89 These effects are illustrated in Figure 
24. Panel A plots the average marginal effects of cross-border share across the range of 
fund sizes. It can be seen from the graph that cross-border share has the strongest and 
most significant effect at the lower fund size levels. Because the effects are negative, this 
indicates that the higher the cross-border share with small fund sizes, the worse the fund 
performance is. However, the effect loses its significance quickly after log(fund size) of 
4 MEUR and even turns positive at around 6.7 MEUR. This, and the steep slope of the 
line, suggest that the effect decreases as fund sizes get bigger and that the effect could 
even be positive with very large fund sizes. Nevertheless, this supports hypothesis 2 that 
fund size moderates the effect of cross-border share on fund performance. 
 
Figure 24: Interaction effects of cross-border share and fund performance on buyout fund performance 
Panel B in Figure 24 plots the same interaction effect from the other side: how the effect 
of fund size on fund performance varies across different levels of cross-border share. 
Here, all effects are negative, and significant until right after cross-border share level of 
0.75, indicating that in many cases large fund size results in bad fund performance 
                                                 
8 The margins-function in R (Leeper, 2018) does not allow for using Heckman selected sample model, 
calculated with the sampleSelection package (Toomet & Henningsen, 2008), to calculate the marginal 
effects. Therefore, an ordinary linear model is used. 
9 Mize (2019) analyses nonlinear interaction effects. However, the interpretation method is similar for linear 
models. 
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regardless of the level of cross-border share, although the effect is larger with low levels 
of cross-border share. The insignificance of the effect with high levels of cross-border 
share provide a possibility that high fund size would have a positive effect on fund 
performance which would provide further support for the preliminary findings in Panel 
A. However, the effect in Panel B is far more flatter than in Panel A indicating that fund 
size is a more impactful factor on fund performance when cross-border share is high than 
what high fund size is with different cross-border share levels. 
Table 10 presents additional models for further investigations on the effects of the 
variables. Starting from the first column, models 9 to 14 include the Heckman selection 
sample with 270 observations, while model 15 uses the sample including reported IRRs. 
All models include vintage dummies, whose values are not shown since they are very 
similar to the values in the models in Table 9. In model 9, a quadratic term of fund size is 
added as a control. The linear term remains significant and negative while the quadratic 
term is positive and significant implying a U-shaped relationship between fund size and 
returns. This result is opposite to some prior literature suggesting a concave relationship 
between fund size and returns. In model 10, the quadratic term of fund size is added as a 
moderator on cross-border share. While fund size and its quadratic term sustain their 
signs, no statistical significances are found. 
Models 11 to 14 introduce the interaction effects on cross-continent share. The results are 
largely insignificant with only club deal share moderator being weakly significant at 10 
% level with an expected positive sign. This gives partial support for hypothesis 3 
although the statistical significance is not strong. In addition, with the moderators present, 
the cross-continent share variable loses its significance. Finally, model 15 shows the full 
model, as in model 7 in Table 9, but adds firm country fixed effects. With firm fixed 
effects included, the significances of cross-border and cross-continent shares as well as 
the fund size moderator on cross-border share reduce to 10 % level. The respective 
negative, positive and positive signs are retained but all the effect sizes are reduced. 
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Table 10: Regression results, additional models 
Dependent variable = Net IRR 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Cross-border share -1.25 -12.23     -19.04† 
 (3.29) (34.31)     (10.14) 
Cross-border share x log(Fund size)  2.17     2.71† 
  (10.16)     (1.58) 
Cross-border share x log(Fund size)2  -0.04      
  (0.77)      
Cross-border share x Club deal share       8.60 
       (7.59) 
Cross-border share x Local office share 
      -6.81 
      (13.37) 
Cross-continent share   -1.56 3.18 9.11 -3.07 5.44† 
   (17.76) (3.55) (6.61) (16.98) (3.28) 
Cross-continent share x log(Fund size)   1.29   1.30  
   (2.43)   (2.20)  
Cross-continent share x Club deal share    13.10†  12.55†  
    (7.90)  (7.54)  
Cross-continent share x Local office 
share 
    -3.89 -5.17  
     (11.71) (11.06)  
log(Fund size) -9.79*** -8.25† -2.69*** -2.61*** -2.60*** -2.76*** -4.02*** 
 (2.90) (4.48) (0.62) (0.52) (0.53) (0.64) (1.11) 
log(Fund size)2 0.63** 0.43      
 (0.22) (0.42)      
Club deal share -5.13 -5.00 -4.31 -5.73 -4.16 -5.88 -4.66 
 (3.45) (3.40) (3.40) (4.01) (3.35) (4.03) (5.42) 
Local office share 8.81** 8.64** 8.02* 7.99* 8.38* 8.65* 15.40 
 (3.30) (3.24) (3.29) (3.22) (3.48) (3.49) (12.48) 
Experience -0.88 -1.08 -1.47 -1.31 -1.42 -1.39 -1.53 
 (1.38) (1.35) (1.40) (1.37) (1.40) (1.34) (1.44) 
Specialization -1.14 -1.18 -1.36 -1.26 -1.38 -1.21 -2.02 
 (1.78) (1.77) (1.79) (1.78) (1.79) (1.79) (1.92) 
Vintage dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GP country fixed effects No No No No No No Yes 
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 226 
Heckman selected samples in models 9 – 14, IRR reported sample in model 15. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p < 
0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05;  † p < 0.1. 
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5 Discussion and conclusions 
5.1 Discussion of results 
This thesis studied the implications of cross-border private equity and its relationship with 
European buyout fund performance. More specifically, this relationship was studied by 
analyzing the effect of buyout funds’ shares of cross-border investments on the funds’ 
returns, through both general cross-border and cross-continent viewpoints. An investment 
was defined as cross-border if the headquarters of the private equity firm and the portfolio 
company are in different countries. Moreover, a few interaction effects were studied. 
First, the interaction of fund size, used as a proxy of general partner skill, was 
investigated. Next, the club deal share of a fund and its interaction on cross-border share 
relationship was included. Finally, it was examined whether higher share of investments 
carried out though a local office moderates the cross-border effect. 
The literature review first looked into the trends of international private equity and 
discussed the nature and challenges of cross-border private equity investing. In addition, 
opportunities provided by cross-border settings and suggested strategies for overcoming 
distance-related hindrances were presented. The findings from this part indicated that 
cross-border investing poses risks for private equity firms because of the cultural distance 
and institutional differences. However, firms can mitigate these risks by learning and 
gaining knowledge through engagement in club deals, obtaining multinational investing 
experience and by setting up local branches. Secondly, the research on private equity 
investment value creation, fund performance, and performance drivers was reviewed. It 
was concluded that private equity fund performance is most affected by fund size, general 
partner skill, fund inflows and syndication. 
Based on the qualitative part, it was hypothesized that despite the challenges, cross-border 
environments would allow for increased investment opportunities, and given the 
challenges, firms would not engage in such deals without careful and extensive screening. 
Therefore, it was assumed that a higher cross-border share in a fund would increase fund 
performance. In addition, it was expected that the challenge-mitigating factors would 
moderate this relationship. The hypotheses were tested by studying European buyout 
funds, with vintages between 2000 to 2010, and their domestic and cross-border 
investments until March 31 2019. The data was drawn from databases of Preqin. 
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The empirical analysis provided mixed results for the relationship between cross-border 
investments and fund performance. Some evidence was found that a high cross-border 
share would affect fund performance negatively which suggests the opposite what was 
expected. On the other hand, the results implied a positive relationship between cross-
continent share and fund returns providing partial support for the hypothesis. In addition, 
as expected, a positive moderating effect of fund size on cross-border share was found 
suggesting that large funds perform better in cross-border settings than smaller funds. 
Finally, only weak partial support for club deal and no support for local office shares’ 
moderating effects were found, although evidence for a positive effect of constituent local 
office share on returns was provided. In the big picture, these results suggest that the 
effect of cross-border share depends on circumstances. A more detailed discussion of the 
results on each hypothesis is provided below. 
Hypothesis 1 
The analysis provides no evidence that the effect of cross-border share on fund 
performance would always be positive as was hypothesized. In fact, the results give some 
indication that the effect might be negative although this result is not statistically 
significant in the model testing the direct effect and is therefore not robust. On the other, 
there is evidence that a high cross-continent investment share would positively affect 
returns. This suggests that there might be differences in the performances of investments 
made on closer and more remote foreign targets. This logic would be in line with the 
results of Nahata et al. (2014) who find distance to be a positive success factor in venture 
capital context and attribute the success to the more diligent screening and monitoring of 
distant foreign portfolio companies. 
In addition, the results provide evidence for a positive relationship between high local 
office investment share and fund returns. This suggests that the non-positive effect of 
cross-border share might be driven by pure cross-border investments while local office 
deals improve performance. This implication builds on the findings of Hammer et al. 
(2018) who find that performance in local office deals is better than in pure cross-border 
deals. This explanation is also consistent with the key findings of the interviews that 
culminate around the following anecdotes: “Private equity business is very much based 
on trust and credibility earned by building good relationships, connections and networks 
with all stakeholders” and that “Proprietary deals, which are the source of superior 
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performance, cannot be attracted without such position as an investor”. In light of the 
results, this implies that cross-border environments can provide improved opportunities 
if engaged in through a local branch which is better connected to the local market. Overall, 
hypotheses 1 is partially supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
The results imply a positive moderating effect of fund size on the relationship between 
cross-border share and fund performance. This supports hypothesis 2. The effect of high 
cross-border share on fund performance is largely negative with low fund sizes and 
becomes less negative as fund size increases. With very high fund sizes the effect is even 
positive. This suggests that a high focus on cross-border investments likely creates value 
for large buyout funds but not for smaller funds. 
This logic can result from a couple of arguments. First, large funds, especially in Europe, 
are likely to be faced with limitations in the supply of sufficiently large deals in their 
domestic markets due to the size distribution of companies. Therefore, they need to seek 
targets across borders to reduce competition and to perform. In addition, the capabilities 
of large funds can be more aligned with large cross-border targets. For example, this is 
supported by comments in the interviews that: “Large firms managing large funds who 
operate internationally can successfully support targets’ internationalization strategies, 
and therefore might have a competitive advantage over local funds.” Small funds, on the 
other hand, have more opportunities in local markets and foreign firms might struggle to 
find good deals unless they have distinct specialization knowledge on a specific industry.  
Second, a bigger funds might be better off in tackling the challenges posed by cross-
border settings, especially those related to peculiarities of foreign environments. This 
stems from the belief that large funds are managed by skilled and experienced general 
partners (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009) who are likely to have 
experience in multinational investing through which they have gained knowledge and 
ability to engage in deals without local participation (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). 
Interestingly, there is strong evidence throughout the results that fund size, in general, 
affects fund performance negatively, which contradicts with previous research. However, 
the funds raised during private equity boom times have been found to perform worse 
(Axelson et al., 2013; Kaplan & Schoar, 2005) and the fund vintages studied in this thesis 
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overlap a period of private equity boom cycle shift (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). Given 
the results, hypothesis 2 is supported. 
Hypothesis 3 
The results provide only weak support for hypothesis 3. There is no evidence that having 
a high share of club deals in a fund would moderate the effect of cross-border share on 
fund performance in general. However, weak evidence about such positive interaction on 
cross-continent share is found. This implies that syndication might be beneficial in cases 
when the distance to the portfolio company’s location is long. This result builds on 
Tykvová and Schertler (2014) who find that in a venture capital setting, syndicating with 
local partners does not help in the case of large institutional difference but rather in great 
geographical distance. European countries have very differing institutional environments 
(Meuleman & Wright, 2011), and therefore local partners might not be as helpful in 
geographically closer cross-border deals than in further. 
Hypothesis 4 
The results provide no support for, or against, the assumption that a high share of local 
office investments would moderate the relationship between cross-border share and fund 
performance. This holds through for both general cross-border share and cross-continent 
share. This implies that the different levels of local office deal share do not influence the 
way cross-border share affects fund performance. 
Contributions 
The findings in this thesis make a few contributions to existing literature and industry 
practitioners. First, and most importantly, they contribute to the literature of private 
equity, especially that of later stage buyout market and cross-border investments. In 
general, prior literature has very much focused on the venture capital market, especially 
on cross-border context. This is puzzling since the growth in private equity fundraising 
and assets under management is driven by buyout funds (McKinsey & Company, 2018) 
and one way to scale a business is to expand internationally. The study extends on the 
literature of cross-border club deals and effects of local branches by connecting them to 
buyout performance. 
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In addition to the generally scarce research of buyout performance in cross-border 
settings, literature has completely neglected these effects on buyout fund level. This study 
helps to lower the gap by providing views on fund-level performance effects in the cross-
border context. Consequently, the study contributes to the discussion on the determinants 
of buyout fund performance. Previous research has mainly focused on analyzing the 
effects of persistence, general partner skill, syndication and macroeconomic situation. 
Little is known about the effects of certain investing strategies on fund performance, most 
likely due to the difficulty of analyzing such investing behavior. This thesis sheds some 
light on the effects of funds’ investing focus on their performance by studying the 
intensity at which funds invest across borders. 
This thesis also makes a few contributions to industry practitioners. This is important 
since the private equity industry is booming, valuations are at record highs and it gets 
difficult for firms to find good deals. Therefore, general partners need to consider 
strategies for sustaining the performance of their funds and sufficient deal flow. In 
addition, the growth in the market suggests there may be room for private equity firms to 
scale their business and expanding across borders could be a valuable option. The results 
in this thesis provide insights for the decision-making in international private equity 
investing. 
For general partners the implications are that investing across borders, without having a 
local branch carrying out the investing process, can be difficult. This holds true especially 
for less experienced funds as skilled general partners with large funds sizes are likely to 
perform better in foreign environments. Moreover, the results suggest that when investing 
in distant environments, extra careful and rigorous screening and monitoring processes 
may need to be taken. In general, expanding operations internationally by opening local 
offices can be a successful strategy for a buyout fund. On the other hand, limited partners 
can analyze the investment behavior of private equity firms, especially those with high 
cross-border investing frequency. This can be beneficial when limited partners decide on 
where to direct their capital. 
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5.2 Reliability and validity 
5.2.1 Reliability 
Reliability in quantitative research refers to the consistency of the results over time and 
whether the results can be reproduced under the same methodology.  More specifically, 
reliability refers to how a repeated measurement remains the same, the stability of the 
measurement over time, and the similarity within a time period (Kirk & Miller, 1986). In 
this thesis, the reliability concerns the choice of variables and the availability of data. 
Regarding variables, all of them were either directly based on variables used in prior 
research or modifications of those. The main independent variables of cross-border share 
were based on definitions of cross-border investments in similar studies but were 
aggregated to the fund level making them novel but intuitive measurements based on 
existing research. The same applies for club deal and local office variables. The 
experience and specialization variables were also based on methods applied in prior 
research. 
As such, the variables used do not set any limitations for the replicability of the study 
given the availability of the data. If data is available, the same variables can be used again 
and over time. All the data is such that it is similar for all observations as fund net IRR is 
measured the same way and fund size is just a reported value. However, as private equity 
industry is cyclical, and firms develop as the industry matures, the results can vary over 
time. Therefore, control variables capturing these effects were used. 
In addition, the availability of data in the private equity industry in general poses 
challenges for fund performance research due to the voluntary nature of data reporting. 
However, as was done in this study, possible selection bias can be considered with 
statistical methods. Further, the data here included funds from multiple geographical 
locations and funds of different sizes suggesting that types of funds from the entire 
population were represented in the data. 
5.2.2 Validity 
The research validity refers to the accuracy of the measurements and that they actually 
measure what they were intended to measure. In this study, validity concerns the analysis 
methods, the variables used and the accuracy of the data. The hypotheses used were 
formed by using a deductive approach where the hypotheses are based on synthesizing 
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prior research. As the object of analysis is tested based on the theories of previously 
validated studies, the approach provides a logical and a reliable measurement. 
The research methods, namely the descriptive analysis and the regression analysis, are 
both very broadly used in private equity research and in quantitative analysis in general. 
For the regression analysis, the most common type ordinary linear squares method was 
used. In addition, the methods for accounting for possible selection bias were rationalized 
based on prior research. The analysis and handling of data was conducted carefully and 
systematically in order to limit the possibility of errors. The data sourced from Preqin can 
also be considered accurate due to the wide use of their data in academic and professional 
settings. 
Due to the variables and methods being rationalized by existing literature, and results 
providing significant effects, the measurement can be considered a successful measure of 
what was intended. This is particularly important as the phenomenon of cross-border 
investments’ influence on buyout fund performance has not been studied before. Despite 
the fact that the main hypothesis was only partially supported, the theoretical part 
provides arguments and explanations for the results. 
Validity also refers to the extent the results of a study can be generalized across other 
samples and wider population. In this study, the data was limited to consider only 
European buyout funds with vintages of 2000 to 2010. Therefore, the results are 
representative in the European population. However, controlling for country fixed effects 
slightly altered the results suggesting that there might be differences in the data across 
different countries. Furthermore, the study cannot be justified to be generalizable to the 
whole world as the effects might be very different especially in the US, which can be 
considered the most sophisticated buyout market. 
Compared to other studies analyzing fund performance, the sample period is slightly 
shorter than usual but in line with the studies that have used Preqin as their data source. 
On the other hand, the deal data covers a period of over 18 years, which can be considered 
representative. The fund vintages fall over a period that included an end in the private 
equity boom cycle and a global financial crisis that might affect the generalizability of 
the results, although vintages were controlled for and the investment follow-up period 
considered being long enough. In addition, cross-border private equity has not been very 
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common before the chosen period, and therefore the effect should be analyzed based on 
recent times. 
Overall, in light of the focus of the study and the underlying research objective, the results 
can be considered generalizable. As the objective was not to estimate absolute fund 
returns but rather the relative effect of cross-border share of a fund on those returns, the 
results provide an overall view on the average direction and size of the effect. 
5.3 Limitations 
Although concluded to be a reliable and a valid study overall, this thesis is faced with a 
few limitations. Most importantly, these limitations are related to the homogeneity of the 
data sources. In fact, all data used in the study, except firms’ local office information, was 
sourced from the databases of Preqin. This may affect the results since, for example, 
Preqin determines industry classifications or since there may be consistent error 
somewhere in Preqin’s data gathering or reporting processes. As discussed above, 
however, Preqin is widely used and these types of limitations are unlikely. Nevertheless, 
prior research studying fund performance has often used and compared data extracted 
from different sources in order to increase the robustness of the data. 
Private equity research in general struggles with the limitations posed by the availability 
and reliability of data and this study is no different. Less than half of the funds included 
in the original data export report any performance data and even less report IRR 
information. Regarding deal data, a little less than 60 % include fund information. In 
addition, there are significant differences in the number of deals per fund as some funds 
were associated with only a few deals and others with well over a hundred. This raises 
questions about the reliability of the data since a very limited number of deals made by a 
fund is most likely not representative of the actual number. Furthermore, there have been 
inconsistent findings in previous research on the accuracy of the reported interim IRRs 
and net asset values by a fund. However, in light of newer research the values were 
concluded to be sufficient enough for the purposes of this study (Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015). 
Due to the absence of a similar study in previous research, the main independent variables 
of cross-border and cross-continent shares have not been used before. Especially, it is 
difficult to assess the effect of individual deals on a fund level since their contributions 
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to the returns of a fund are not disclosed. Although buyout funds often follow a certain 
strategy in the sizes, industries and types of deals they make, some deals most likely 
contribute more to the overall performance of the fund. Any individual characteristics of 
the deals have not been controlled for in this study and all deals are included equally-
weighted. Rather, these effects are aggregated to the fund level as shares of the total fund 
deal activity, which depicts the frequency of that a fund engages in such deals. 
Furthermore, the study might be faced with possible endogeneity issues that ideally 
should be addressed. These issues stem from the fact that private equity firms do not 
engage in cross-border investing randomly. Therefore, the explanatory variables 
measuring cross-border and cross-continent shares are prone to endogeneity. Oftentimes, 
this type of a study is not an experimental research with a random sample and a control 
group which would prevent the variables being endogenous. Instrumental variable 
techniques and Heckman selection correction are possible ways to address the bias. 
5.4 Future research 
This thesis contributes to the cross-border private equity research by being the first study 
to analyze the relationship between cross-border investments and private equity fund 
performance in the buyout setting. Furthermore, it strengthens the position of European 
private equity research, as studies on US-based firms are far more common. As 
internationalization and cross-border investing provide an interesting opportunity for 
firms to scale their business and increase deal flow, the implications of such investing are 
important to be studied. The results provided by this study, as well as the few limitations, 
provide interesting avenues for future research. 
Firstly, difference in the results of the effects of general cross-border share and cross-
continent shares warrants for more thorough research on the determinants of these 
differences. Especially, it could be studied whether a large distance between the general 
partner and the target company leads to more rigorous and careful due diligence and 
monitoring, therefore increasing the chance of selecting superior targets and increased 
value-adding activity. Therefore, variables capturing the geographical and cultural 
distances should be included. In addition, the factors affecting the success in cross-border 
buyout transactions should be studied.  
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Secondly, given the positive performance effects of local office deal share, it would be 
valuable to understand how firms choose the locations they end up establishing offices 
in. In particular, it would be interesting to know what the specific gains are that a firm 
gets by establishing a local branch. This could help firms determine whether expanding 
operations internationally is profitable, or could such gains be obtained with fewer 
investments. Furthermore, an overall understanding on why firms choose to engage in 
pure cross-border deals would be beneficial since, given the suggested challenges, it could 
be expected that the deals in question are perceived superior. 
Finally, to provide robustness for the study, it would be valuable to conduct a similar 
analysis on a larger dataset gathered from a different source. Different timeframes can 
yield different results especially on a cyclical business such as private equity. For 
example, fund size has often been found to positively affect fund returns, while in this 
study the effect was opposite. In addition, different databases may have different data 
sourcing and reporting methods, which could affect the availability or reliability of the 
data. Replicating the study on a larger sample and data from different sources would 
contribute to the generalizability of the results. 
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